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INTRODUCTION
In March 2007, almost exactly a quarter-century after the first Equal
Rights Amendment’s ratification failure, a bipartisan group of lawmakers
reintroduced the rechristened but textually identical “Women’s Equality
Amendment” in both houses of Congress. Politicians and pundits declared
the initiative the first serious attempt to revive the amendment in decades,
suggesting that unlike previous quiet, desultory efforts, advocates of equal
rights meant business this time.1 The amendment’s reintroduction provoked
reactions ranging from enthusiasm to derision to incredulity. Some welcomed the ERA’s revival as an opportunity to revisit unresolved questions
of gender equality and justice.2 Opponents bemoaned the amendment as tediously redundant, shockingly radical, or both.3 Still others, including longtime proponents of women’s rights, questioned whether a renewed
campaign for a controversial and arguably ill-defined constitutional
amendment was the wisest allocation of resources and political capital.4
Commentators debated how an ERA would change existing law, how an increasingly conservative judiciary would interpret its text, and how the
amendment effort would alter the political and partisan landscape.5
If these questions evoke a feeling of déjà vu, their eerie familiarity is
no coincidence. The question of whether to continue to pursue feminist
goals through a constitutional amendment despite the bitter ratification defeat of 1982 arose even before the first ERA’s demise became official.
Congressional proponents resolved to reintroduce the ERA in 1983, and
both chambers held extensive hearings before and after the House narrowly
voted to reject “ERA II.” Early scholarly accounts of the ERA’s rise and
fall largely viewed ERA II as a postscript to ERA I, if they discussed it at
all. This Article examines ERA II as a distinct phenomenon, with a constitutional and political meaning quite different from that of ERA I.
The debate over ERA II occurred at a pivotal turning point in the history of legal feminism and of constitutional amendment advocacy. In dialogue with their opponents, women’s rights advocates grappled with
difficult doctrinal dilemmas largely unaddressed in earlier congressional
1

A1.

Juliet Eilperin, New Drive Afoot to Pass Equal Rights Amendment, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2007, at

2

See, e.g., Martha Burk & Eleanor Smeal, The One Sure Way to Guarantee Equal Rights for Women, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr. 30, 2007, at 15.
3
See, e.g., Phyllis Schlafly, Equal Rights Redux; The ERA: Still a Bad Idea, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2007, at M3; Phyllis Schlafly, Left Schemes to Revive ERA, HUMAN EVENTS, Apr. 16, 2007, at 1.
4
See, e.g., Frances Coleman, Don’t Let It All Slip Away with the ERA, PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile,
Ala.), May 20, 2007, at D1; Rob Hotakainen, Equal Rights Amendment Divides Party, AKRON BEACON
J., May 20, 2007, at A14; Jonathan Turley, The Revival of the Equal Rights Amendment, ROLL CALL,
Apr. 16, 2007, at 4.
5
See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Be Careful What You Wish For, LEGAL TIMES, June 4, 2007, at 58; Postings
of Ilya Somin and Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy (Apr. 9–13, 2007), http://volokh.com/
posts/chain_1176163135.shtml.
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debates over ERA I. They articulated a vision of “equality of rights under
the law” that eschewed “equality in theory”—formal equality—and embraced “equality in fact,” which dismantled “neutral” laws and practices
that disadvantaged women.6 With ERA II, the proposed constitutional
amendment enjoyed a new career as a partisan political weapon. Ultimately, feminists’ ERA II experience convinced the movement’s lawyers
that amendment advocacy could not accomplish their reconfigured agenda.
In reinventing the ERA, feminists took an important step toward transforming the legal aspirations and strategies of the women’s movement and the
very nature of constitutional change advocacy.
*

*

*

The Equal Rights Amendment’s ratification deadline passed on June
30, 1982, with the amendment failing to win the required three-fourths majority of states. Postmortems from scholars and advocates poured in over
the next several years, assessing the reasons for the ERA’s defeat.7 More
recently, many scholars have shifted their attention from dissecting the
ERA’s failure to measuring its stealthy success.8 Though there is considerable disagreement over how the transformation came about, constitutional
law experts agree that feminists ultimately succeeded in achieving many, if
not most, of their goals through litigation and legislation, despite the ERA’s
defeat.9 Assessing the merits of this claim is tricky, for at least two reasons.
First, answering the question of how much of what the ERA would have
done that was instead accomplished through other means assumes that we
can know what the ERA would have done—how it would have been interpreted by courts; how it would have been implemented by Congress and the
Executive Branch; how advocates would have extracted new meanings and
new ramifications with regard to issues the amendment’s earlier proponents
6

See infra Part II.B.
See, e.g., MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED (1986); JANET K. BOLES, THE POLITICS OF
THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1979); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986);
DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE SHERRON DE HART, SEX, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF ERA (1990);
GILBERT Y. STEINER, CONSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY: THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT (1985).
8
See, e.g., Cynthia Harrison, ‘Heightened Scrutiny’: An Alternative Route to Equality for U.S.
Women, in WOMEN AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 347 (Sybil A. Schwarzenbach & Patricia
Smith eds., 2003); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1332–34 (2006); David A. Strauss, The
Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001).
9
See, e.g., Ilya Somin, What Effect Would the Equal Rights Amendment Have if Enacted?, Volokh
Conspiracy, Apr. 7, 2007, http://volokh.com/posts/1176163135.shtml (“As Northwestern University law
professor Andrew Koppelman puts it, Phyllis Schlafly and other opponents [of the ERA] won the battle
but lost the war: ‘The ERA was defeated, but its rule against sex discrimination was incorporated into
constitutional law anyway, by judicial interpretation of the 14th Amendment . . . .’ In fact, says Koppelman, ‘it’s hard to imagine it making any difference at all.’”).
7

1225

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

never contemplated; and how the answers to all of these questions would
have changed over time. Second, the question of whether feminists gained
by other means what they hoped to achieve through an ERA belies the fact
that what they hoped to achieve was a moving target.
By the early 1980s, much of what feminists sought from the ERA diverged significantly from the preoccupations of proponents and opponents
during the early-1970s creation of ERA I’s legislative history. To some degree, the ERA’s evolving meaning reflected feminists’ successes and failures under existing constitutional provisions. But it also revealed
substantial change over time in what feminists hoped to achieve through an
amendment: a constitutional response not only to intentional discrimination
and laws that explicitly denied women opportunities, but also to the unintentional perpetuation of inequality through laws and policies that appeared
neutral on their face—a conception of equality that included the right to affirmative action, remedies for disparate impact discrimination, and broader
freedom from discrimination based on pregnancy.
The debate over ERA II provides an excellent case study in the creation of constitutional meaning through amendment advocacy. Even (especially) after a decade of bitter contention over the ERA, the amendment’s
meaning—what it would do in the short and long term—was far from clear.
Though the text of ERA II exactly replicated that of ERA I,10 the ratification
battle had transformed the contest’s terrain, implicating issues barely contemplated in the original congressional debates. The initial ratification period had not proven conducive to a coordinated, internally consistent, and
explicit account of the amendment’s legal ramifications. Instead, proponents often found themselves on the defensive, and decisionmaking was diffuse. In contrast, the reintroduction of the ERA and the emergence of
sophisticated opposition to the amendment in Congress forced advocates to
reexamine exactly what they wanted from the ERA and to refine their account of its impact on the law. The congressional hearings on ERA II
prompted feminists to evaluate how far they had come, to assess how far
they wished to go, and to clarify exactly how much of their redefined agenda the ERA could help them achieve.
Today, it is far from obvious how one should interpret ERA II in the
larger context of constitutional amendment advocacy. It was even less selfevident in 1982 and 1983, when feminists, their allies, and their opponents
surveyed the political and legal landscape in the wake of the defeat of ERA
I. Part I of this Article offers three possible accounts of ERA II’s purpose
and significance. Part I.A, which examines ERA II as a political weapon,
suggests a role for amendment advocacy beyond the creation of constitu10

The text of the Equal Rights Amendment read as follows: “Section 1. Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Section
2. Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this Article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.”
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tional meaning. While feminists primarily sought to alter women’s legal
and constitutional status, their congressional allies were at least as eager to
make political hay of the Reagan Administration’s less than enthusiastic
embrace of women’s rights. Even if a successful constitutional amendment
remained out of reach, these politicians calculated, forcing opponents to
vote “no” on equal rights for women might boost the electoral fortunes of
Democrats and moderate Republicans, or at least help to discredit the Reagan Administration in advance of its reelection campaign and undermine
social conservatives’ apparent hold on the GOP. In the wake of the ERA’s
defeat, women’s organizations publicly resolved to devote more energy and
resources toward electing candidates who supported the ERA and other feminist positions, and to defeating those who did not. Reintroducing the
ERA provided an opportunity to further this goal, highlighting not only how
the preceding decade had transformed the amendment’s ideological and
partisan valence, but also how the very enterprise of amendment advocacy
had evolved into a weapon of political combat.
A second possible account of ERA II was as a relatively seamless continuation of the debate over ERA I. In this account, described in Part I.B, it
made sense to stand by the amendment’s original legislative history as developed in the early 1970s, and to stress the abstract principle of equality
rather than specific legal ramifications and doctrinal innovations. Despite
broad agreement that ERA I fell short of promising the fulfillment of feminists’ substantive goals, for some proponents, particularly veterans of the
first ERA campaign, reinventing the amendment’s meaning seemed politically futile and even counterproductive. Soon after the congressional hearings began, though, it became clear that proponents could not avoid probing
questions about ERA II’s theoretical and doctrinal particularities. Like it or
not, the ERA II hearings compelled feminists to rethink their legal priorities. Despite their ambivalence about the political consequences, feminists
seized this opportunity to redefine the amendment’s constitutional meaning.
In the end, feminists created a new constitutional meaning for ERA II
in dialogue with their opponents. Like the “de facto ERA” Reva Siegel has
identified as the product of give-and-take between friends and foes of the
amendment during the ratification period,11 ERA II as defined by its defenders incorporated some of its opponents’ assumptions as well as its proponents’ aspirations. Unlike during the ratification period, though, when
movement strategy was diffuse and decentralized, the process of constructing a legislative history for the new ERA was relatively deliberate and coordinated. This focusing of the collective mind proved both an advantage
and a limitation for feminists. On the one hand, they presented a relatively
disciplined, united front in favor of positions that would demonstrably have
advanced the law beyond its current boundaries. On the other, political
considerations still constrained their ability to implement many of the goals
11

Siegel, supra note 8, at 1324.
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to which they privately—and sometimes publicly—aspired, and determined
questioning from opponents forced the development of limiting principles
to rein in revolutionary doctrinal changes. Proponents’ positions on ERA
II’s legal consequences almost invariably occupied a middle ground between feminists’ highest aspirations in 1983 and the meaning of ERA I as
articulated in the 1971–72 legislative history.
Part II details the process by which proponents attempted to develop a
new legislative history for the ERA. Part II.A briefly describes how the legal landscape of sex equality had changed since congressional passage of
ERA I. Part II.B focuses on the controversy over the proper standard of judicial review under the ERA and the debate over how to address inequality
that persisted despite the removal of most explicit sex-based classifications
from the books. Part II.C looks at the struggle over how ERA II would affect private entities, in light of proponents’ attempts to overcome the strictures of an increasingly conservative state action jurisprudence and
opponents’ concerns about incursions on the autonomy of private—and especially religious—institutions. Part II.D examines the formidable obstacles in the way of feminists’ profound desire to transcend the strategic
separation of reproductive rights from the ERA without spelling political
doom for both causes. Part II.E addresses the substantive and strategic interactions between ERA II and other vehicles of constitutional change.
The final Part considers the legacies of ERA II. Part III.A revisits the
frame of ERA II as political weapon, introduced in Part I.A. Hoping to create momentum for passage—or at least to embarrass conservatives—
proponents forced an up-or-down vote on the amendment in the House,
which they narrowly lost. ERA supporters faced criticism from both friend
and foe for this parliamentary maneuver, but for a brief time it seemed as if
the amendment’s secondary role as a partisan battering ram might help Democrats and moderate Republicans to exploit the “gender gap.” Despite a
short-lived boost from the first female vice-presidential candidacy, however, the ERA’s career as a political weapon appeared over.
Nevertheless, the ERA II debate left important legacies for legal feminism and for constitutional amendment advocacy, as described in Part III.B.
Arguments honed during the hearings became important bases for a new
feminist constitutional agenda, particularly in the area of disparate impact
analysis. Just as importantly, the ERA II controversy drove home the
shortcomings of constitutional amendment as a means of implementing legal feminist goals. And the ERA II debate provides an important set of
sources for scholars seeking to understand what changed—and what remained impervious to change—during one of the most crucial decades in
the history of American women’s legal status.
As the Article’s conclusion suggests, the story of ERA II develops several themes salient to the literature on constitutional change and social
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movement advocacy.12 Most basically, focusing on the (re)introduction of a
proposed constitutional amendment and the campaign for congressional
passage highlights the importance of venues other than courts and processes
other than litigation to the creation and contestation of constitutional meaning.13 The ERA II debate also underscores the significance of amendment
advocacy even in instances where a proposed Article V amendment is considered and rejected by Congress. In keeping with the emerging literature
on constitutional culture and “democratic constitutionalism,”14 the ERA II
story emphasizes the extent to which the creation of constitutional meaning
occurs through a dialogic process, forcing combatants to consider and even
incorporate the arguments of their opponents into both substantive constitutional interpretation and strategic calculations.15 The ERA II experience
suggests that amendment advocacy may serve as a weapon of partisan political combat, as well as a vehicle for rethinking a social movement’s legal
agenda.16 Finally, ERA II’s role at a transitional moment in the history of
legal feminism suggests that what appears to be devastating defeat may simultaneously liberate a movement’s constitutional imagination.
I. THREE ACCOUNTS OF ERA II’S PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE
After a bruising, decade-long ratification battle, the women’s movement had reached a crossroads. Back in 1972, when the ERA first passed
Congress, ratification had seemed, if not assured, altogether likely. When
House leaders reintroduced the ERA to the 98th Congress in January 1983,
feminist leaders knew all too well the magnitude of the obstacles to passage
and ratification, and they confronted the prospect of a rematch with considerable ambivalence.17 But like it or not, Congress was considering the ERA
once again. Faced with the alternative of allowing the amendment’s foes to
define its meaning, women’s organizations launched a concerted effort to
coordinate testimony and advocacy for “ERA II.” But before I examine
that effort in detail in Part II, in this Part I explore various possible accounts
of what proponents were doing, or believed themselves to be doing, when
they launched and executed their campaign for ERA II.

12

For examples of this burgeoning field, see sources cited in Siegel, supra note 8, at 1328 n.13.
A voluminous and growing literature critiques “juricentric” accounts of constitutional meaning.
My aim in this Article is primarily descriptive: to uncover the rich constitutional contestation that occurs
in the attempted creation of one proposed constitutional amendment’s legislative history.
14
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
15
Siegel, supra note 8.
16
I have explored elsewhere the mutual influence of constitutional change advocacy and internal
social movement dynamics. See Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 755 (2004).
17
BERRY, supra note 7, at 101.
13
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A. ERA II as Political Weapon
For some ERA proponents, most prominently the amendment’s congressional sponsors, ERA II’s primary function was to serve as a political
battering ram to attack the Reagan Administration and the conservative
wing of the Republican Party. For many feminists, this function, although
not their first priority, provided an important secondary benefit. After all,
many women’s rights leaders realized that the ratification failure could be
reversed only through persuading or defeating ERA critics and antiabortion
advocates in Congress and the state legislatures. For those with Democratic
leanings, Reagan-bashing was comfortable and dovetailed with a general
political outlook. For Republican feminists, the President’s opposition to
the ERA symbolized a larger drift to the social and cultural right that dismayed and demoralized the party’s liberals and moderates.
When Congress considered the original ERA in 1971 and 1972, the
amendment had no particular partisan pedigree, and even its ideological valence remained ambiguous. Some of the amendment’s most ardent supporters had been conservatives like Senator Strom Thurmond, Dixiecratturned-Republican from South Carolina,18 while there was some Democratic
opposition to the amendment because of the threat it posed to protective labor legislation. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) was still a recent
ERA convert in the early 1970s, as were many in the labor movement.19
The amendment had the nominal support of the Nixon Administration and
prominent women in the Administration were avid supporters. Anti-ERA
witnesses included Paul Freund, a Harvard law professor with impeccable
civil rights credentials.20
Political developments over the next dozen years transformed the ERA
into a potent symbol of partisan and ideological polarization.21 The Reagan
Administration and the GOP opposed the amendment outright, while Democratic support for the ERA had become an article of faith, at least at the
national level. Indeed, debates over gender roles and over the desirability
18

On alliances between the National Woman’s Party and segregationist Southerners, see, for example, LEILA J. RUPP & VERTA TAYLOR, SURVIVAL IN THE DOLDRUMS: THE AMERICAN WOMEN’S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1945 TO THE 1960S (1987); Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and
the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. HIST. 37 (1983).
19
On labor opposition to the ERA during the pre-1970s period, see, for example, DOROTHY SUE
COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN
AMERICA (2004); CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S ISSUES,
1945–1968 (1988).
20
Compare, e.g., Paul A. Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 234 (1971) (arguing against the ERA and in favor of a case-by-case approach to combating sex
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment), with Paul A. Freund, Civil Rights and the Limits of
the Law, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 199 (1965) (defending proactive legal approaches to civil rights for African
Americans).
21
On the partisan realignment with respect to gender issues generally during this period, see Anne
N. Costain, After Reagan: New Party Attitudes Toward Gender, 515 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 114 (1991).
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of sex equality were in no small part responsible for an ongoing partisan realignment that placed cultural issues at the center of political discourse and
marginalized moderate voices within the Republican Party. Pundits credited the newly powerful and visible “Religious Right” with Reagan’s victory in the 1980 election, and few individuals could take more credit for
mobilizing grassroots support for religious conservative political activism—
especially among Christian women—than the architect of the STOP ERA
movement, Phyllis Schlafly.22
The 1980 election produced another new, much-discussed political
phenomenon—the electoral “gender gap.” After decades of voting for Democrats and Republicans in proportions virtually identical to their male
counterparts, women were turning away from Reagan and the GOP in unprecedented numbers.23 The gender gap, commentators would later conclude, stemmed not so much from differences of opinion on issues like the
ERA and abortion rights, but rather from concerns about Reagan’s aggressive foreign policy, his prioritization of defense over domestic spending,
and deep cuts in social programs amidst recession and growing economic
inequality. But although later scholarly assessments would undermine the
theory that Reagan’s opposition to the ERA contributed significantly to the
gender gap, contemporaneous media accounts gave the idea considerable
currency.24 Once in office, the Reagan Administration also came under fire
from civil rights and women’s groups outraged at the Executive Branch’s
failure to vigorously enforce antidiscrimination laws. By 1982, Republican
feminists and moderates were openly breaking with the Administration and
warning that the party risked permanently losing a crucial voting bloc if it
continued to antagonize female voters.25
Women’s organizations like the National Organization for Women
(NOW) recognized the gender gap as a political opportunity, or at least a
silver lining on the rapidly gathering clouds of conservatism.26 In the years
22

For more on Schlafly, see DONALD CRITCHLOW, A WOMAN’S CRUSADE: PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY
GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM (2006); CAROL FELSENTHAL, SWEETHEART OF THE SILENT
MAJORITY (1981); MATHEWS & DE HART, supra note 7.
23
See sources cited infra notes 24–26.
24
See, e.g., Steven V. Roberts, Surveys on Women’s Reaction Worry White House, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 1982, at B6; see also sources cited infra note 30. Political scientist Jane Mansbridge concluded
that there was little or no evidence that female ERA supporters based their vote on the issue to any
greater degree than men. Jane J. Mansbridge, Myth and Reality: The ERA and the Gender Gap in the
1980 Election, 49 PUB. OPINION Q. 164 (1985).
In the years since the emergence of the “gender gap,” scholars have advanced various hypotheses to
explain the phenomenon. See, e.g., Jeff Manza & Clem Brooks, The Gender Gap in U.S. Presidential
Elections: When? Why? Implications? 103 AM. J. SOC. 1235 (1998) (examining the impact of labor
force participation on voting patterns).
25
See, e.g., Associated Press, Reagan’s Concept of America Hurts Party, Packwood Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 1982, at D22.
26
Mansbridge gives NOW the lion’s share of the credit for perpetuating the notion that Reagan’s
opposition to the ERA caused the gender gap. See Mansbridge, supra note 24, at 166, 171.
AND
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before the ERA died its official death, women’s groups mounted campaigns
to defeat anti-ERA state legislators.27 In some instances, female candidates,
galvanized by the uphill battle for ratification, ran for local and state office
on a pro-ERA platform.28 When ratification failure appeared certain, ERA
supporters vowed to reintroduce the amendment and hold legislators accountable for their votes in the 1982 federal and state elections.29 The national press regularly ran articles emphasizing the electoral gender gap and
its increasing importance to feminists’ political strategy.30 Even—perhaps
especially—while in its death throes, the ERA proved a lucrative fundraising vehicle for organizations like NOW.31 Feminist leaders frankly acknowledged that the large sums raised in the final months of the ratification
campaign stemmed in large part from women’s growing frustration with the
Reagan Administration.32 Feminist leaders argued that “[w]ith the backing
of the proved fund-raising capability, the sharp criticisms of Mr. Reagan by
women could be easily harnessed to have a major impact on the November
elections.”33 Columnist Ellen Goodman predicted in early June:
[E]ven if it fails, the amendment and the activism behind it aren’t going to disappear in a puff of smoke . . . . These women have learned how the system
works and how it doesn’t work. In politics, the slogan is: Don’t get mad, get
even. In ERA politics, they know how to do both.34

To be sure, feminists were divided about the level of energy and resources they should devote to renewing the battle for an ERA, as opposed
to pursuing their goals through other means. National Abortion Rights Action League director Nanette Falkenberg said on the eve of the ratification
deadline, “There is a real raging debate . . . over whether the emphasis continues to go toward ratifying the ERA or whether the focus of activities
should shift to abortion and other issues.”35 At the local level, many ERA
activists planned to “shift their energies, for the present, away from a sec-

27

See, e.g., John Herbers, Women Turn View to Public Office, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1982, at A1.
Enid Nemy, Feminist Cause Looks Back to Grass Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1982, at B10.
29
Associated Press, Equal Rights Supporters Plan to Re-Offer Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
1982, at A16; Beverly Stephen, ERA: The Good Fight Will Continue, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1982, at G3.
30
See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Women’s Political Habits Show Sharp Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1982, at A1; Bill Peterson, Women’s Political Views Shifting, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1982, at G12.
31
Jane Perlez, NOW’s Funds Soar Suggesting Extent of Women’s Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
1982, at C1.
32
Id. (“Mrs. Smeal and other feminist leaders believe that the money coming into NOW for the ratification drive is motivated in part by the far higher negative rating women give President Reagan than
men give him.”).
33
Id.
34
Ellen Goodman, ERA Foes Are Pigging Out on a New ‘Harmony’-to-be, L.A. TIMES, June 8,
1982, at C5.
35
Joann S. Lublin, Where Does the Women’s Movement Go Now?, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1982, at
26.
28
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ond ratification campaign toward other fronts.”36 On the other hand, plans
to reintroduce the ERA proceeded apace. The New York Times predicted
that “there will be an E.R.A. II, not because the male and female supporters
of equal rights are diehards or sore losers but because it is necessary.”37
Goodman forecasted that feminists would continue to push for an ERA, but
that it would take at least another decade to achieve success.38
Over the weeks and months following the first ERA’s expiration, a
new approach took shape: feminists would continue to support the amendment, but would devote more of their political resources and energies toward financing candidates who would stand up for feminist positions on all
issues, including the ERA, and toward defeating those who opposed the
amendment, abortion rights, and other issues of concern to feminists. When
ERA supporters officially conceded defeat six days before the ratification
deadline, NOW President Eleanor Smeal announced at a news conference
that the organization’s primary goal would be to “chang[e] the composition
of Congress as well as the state legislatures to include a significantly larger
proportion of women and of men who are genuinely feminists.”39 NOW
would devote its fundraising and public relations apparatus to electoral politics. Electing more women and sympathetic men, feminists hoped, would
both stimulate a new ERA ratification drive and promote better policies in
areas such as child care, domestic violence, economic equality, and reproductive rights. Smeal foresaw the creation of “an independent third political force that will represent women’s interests.”40 She announced in August
1982 that the organization would mark the anniversary of the Nineteenth
Amendment with a $3 million fundraising drive to back candidates who
supported the ERA.41
Many Democrats and some moderate Republicans proved eager to embrace the new ERA. For members with sympathetic constituencies, signing
on as a cosponsor was a costless way to curry favor with women’s groups,
now a force to be reckoned with in American politics, and served as a welcome means of embarrassing the Reagan Administration. Two weeks after
the first ERA’s defeat, more than two hundred senators and representatives
reintroduced the amendment, as House Speaker Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill
(D-MA) and Senator Kennedy trumpeted their commitment to equality be-
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Elsa Brenner, E.R.A. Backers See Challenge in Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1982, at CN1.
Editorial, Equal Rights, the Retail Way, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1982, at A16.
38
See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Amendment Runs Out of Time: Nothing Can Kill the Idea—It Will Start
Again, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1982, at C5.
39
Associated Press, NOW Concedes Defeat on ERA, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1982, at A2.
40
Lublin, supra note 35.
41
United Press Int’l, N.O.W. Opens $3 Million Drive for Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1982, at
A9. The election of Judy Goldsmith to succeed Smeal signaled, according to Goldsmith, “a very strong
mandate for a continuation of our electoral, political, and economic direction that we have taken in the
last year.” Associated Press, Goldsmith Elected President of NOW, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1982, at B14.
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fore a crowd of several hundred in front of the Capitol.42 Moderate Senator
Bob Packwood (R-OR) predicted that his party would lose several House
seats in the upcoming election and eventually “go out of existence” if the
GOP continued to “write off 90 percent of minorities and 50 percent of
women.”43
Despite some private ambivalence about the wisdom of reintroducing
the ERA, feminist lawyers publicly reaffirmed the need for a new amendment. In a lengthy and detailed op-ed published in the Los Angeles Times
in mid-July, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund Legal Director Phyllis Segal called the ERA “essential” and declared, “The question is not
‘whether’ the ERA will become part of the Constitution, but ‘when.’”44 A
supportive editorial ran the next day, opining that “[t]he slate is clean. The
backers of the equal rights amendment are starting over. This time around,
they must define the issues themselves . . . .”45 Despite her private misgivings, NOW President Judy Goldsmith enthused, “It’s like the classic experience when you say, ‘[i]f only I could do that over again and do it right.’
We have that chance.”46
Of course, feminists and liberal lawmakers were hardly the only potential beneficiaries of the ERA’s political fallout. ERA I had played a significant role in mobilizing a previously underappreciated political
constituency—the conservative Christian women who flocked in large
42

Lynn Rosellini, U.S. Equal Rights Measure Is Re-Introduced in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
1982, at B13.
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Phyllis N. Segal, Women Won’t Be Satisfied with Piecemeal Reform, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1982,
at E5.
45
Editorial, “We Are All Equal, That Is All”, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1982, at C4. Mixed results in the
1982 elections did not deter those who would link the ERA to the electoral gender gap. Indeed, NOW
President Judy Goldsmith attributed NOW’s renewed push for ERA II to feminists’ “extraordinarily
successful” efforts in the “Remember in November” campaign, an initiative to remind voters of the positions their legislators had taken on the ERA and encourage them to vote accordingly. Letter from Judy
Goldsmith, President, NOW, to NOW Activists (Jan. 1983) (on file with NOW Papers, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Box 192, Folder 30). “The groundswell of support [in
Congress] for ERA re-introduction is unmistakably a tribute to our political effectiveness and to the
emergence of women as a political force that must be reckoned with,” Goldsmith told supporters in January 1983. Id. at 1; see also Memorandum from Mary Jean Collins to Goldsmith, Timmer, Webb, and
Chapman, Reintroduction of the ERA 2 (Jan. 3, 1983) (on file with NOW Papers, Schlesinger Library,
Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Box 197, Folder 7) (“As you know our public position has been
cautious on passage this year and to orient our strategy toward the 1984 elections. It appears that momentum is being created in Congress because of the 1984 elections and because Democrats are anxious
to retain the support of women . . . . Because of the clear positive support we are responding positively
in the press to the reality of reintroduction. The 1982 elections showed we remembered in November
and that women’s political power and candidates’ positions on ERA will be an issue in November 1984
and other elections prior to that one.”). As the 98th Congress began its first session that same month, the
Los Angeles Times editorialized that the second ERA campaign “may be just as difficult as the first, but
this time around the amendment’s backers are organized and have proved they can punish their opponents at the polls.” Editorial, ERA: Those Who Are Wrong, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1983, at C4.
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numbers to Phyllis Schlafly’s STOP ERA movement. Threatened by feminism’s assault on traditional gender roles and promotion of reproductive
rights, female workforce participation, and sexual freedom, these women
adeptly adopted the tactics of their opponents—political organizing, direct
action, lobbying, public speaking, and direct mailing. Schlafly and her followers helped to foster the rise of grassroots conservatism within the Republican Party.47 Conservative activists publicly professed disgust and
disbelief at the amendment’s reintroduction, though they could not resist an
additional opportunity to paint their opponents as radicals bent on destroying the traditional family, forcing women into military service, providing
abortion on demand, and promoting homosexuality.48 GOP insiders reported that many Republican senators were loath to be forced to take a position on ERA II.49
However, conservatives in Congress were not without a stake in the
amendment’s reintroduction. At the very least, Senator Orrin Hatch (RUT), the chairman of the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution, apparently hoped that holding hearings would “make [the ERA]
controversial so senators feel the heat.”50 Indeed, ERA II arguably provided
Hatch with an opportunity to lend legitimacy and legal sophistication to an
opposition movement often accused of hysteria, duplicity, and willful misunderstanding of the law. If he could interrogate proponents about the specific ramifications of the amendment in a calm, rational manner, their real
agenda would be exposed without so much as a single reference to murdered babies or lesbian conspiracies.
Thus, political combat was one frame within which participants in the
ERA II debate viewed their support or opposition. Of course, that frame
had very different ramifications for different political actors. For liberal
politicians, supporting the amendment was a relatively costless way of shoring up support among an increasingly important constituency and, moreover, of embarrassing the Reagan Administration and the right wing of the
Republican Party in advance of the 1984 elections. For moderates within
the GOP, support for the ERA was a means of asserting independence from
a party that increasingly marginalized centrists. For feminist activists, the
amendment could serve as a device to smoke out opponents of feminism
and subject them to retribution at the polls, or at the very least, to raise
47

See CRITCHLOW, supra note 22.
See, e.g., Letter from Jean E. Doyle, National Right to Life Committee (Oct. 27, 1983) (on file
with NOW Papers, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Box 191, Folder 1);
Letter from Jerry Falwell to Jennie Thompson (Mar. 8, 1983) (on file with NOW Papers, Schlesinger
Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Box 175, Folder 14). When President Reagan consulted with Schlafly in March 1983 to discuss possible approaches to the ERA, she urged him to focus
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money for sympathetic candidates and causes. For conservatives, the
ERA’s reintroduction was a potentially dangerous distraction, but also an
opportunity to showcase their side’s legal sophistication and highlight the
weaknesses of proponents’ arguments.
B. ERA II as ERA I, Part II
Given the temporal continuity of the first ERA ratification campaign
and the amendment’s immediate reintroduction without textual alteration, it
is hardly surprising that many feminists—and the scholars who wrote the
first wave of ERA histories—initially saw the campaign for ERA II as
merely an extension of the debate over ERA I. References to the inevitability of a decade-long ratification campaign even in the event of successful
congressional passage made ERA II seem more like a slightly nightmarish
rerun than a carefully updated remake. There was considerable continuity
between the two debates in that many of the issues that were front and center with respect to ERA II had arisen during the ERA I ratification campaign, and in that sense were not new. Rather than reassessing the ERA’s
meaning in great and reflective detail, it made sense to many proponents to
stick with their preratification stance—focusing on the principle of equality
and referring skeptics to the original 1971–72 legislative history when
pressed for details.
A number of factors weighed in favor of a strategy characterizing ERA
II in the abstract, as an important symbolic advance that would have significant but not revolutionary effects on women’s legal status. If ERA supporters were to succeed in winning congressional passage of the amendment for
a second time, it would likely not be through changing legislative minds
about the substance of the amendment, but rather by convincing members
of Congress that it was in their political interest to support ERA II—or in
their political disinterest to oppose it.
Moreover, the ratification struggle had suggested to proponents that the
more they could characterize the ERA as a matter of high principle—of
equality and justice in the abstract—the better. Public opinion polls indicated that most Americans supported “equality” in these broad terms, but
inevitably support softened when specific applications of the equality principle surfaced, or opponents had the opportunity to characterize the
amendment’s particular projected effects.51
Reliance on equality as an abstract principle also made sense as a longterm strategic matter. Given that courts were growing increasingly conservative in their interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause,52 the ERA
might meet a similar fate, at least in the short run. But if feminists could
51
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achieve greater electoral success and more progressive judicial appointments, a general guarantee of equality might be more susceptible to expansive interpretation later on.
Purely pragmatic considerations also supported the characterization of
ERA II as a replica of ERA I. Simply put, if ERA I couldn’t win ratification, there was little reason to believe that a more ambitious version of the
amendment would—especially in an increasingly conservative political
climate. Further, part of the reason for refusing to give up the ERA ghost
was a fear that the amendment’s failure would be interpreted as a national
rejection of the equality principle. If a large part of the ERA’s continuing
relevance was as a symbolic affirmation of sex equality and a rejection of
the antifeminism the amendment helped to foment, then seeing ERA II as
identical to ERA I made sense.
Finally, admitting that the ERA would have profound effects on the
law and on women’s status in American society belied the assurances proponents had grown accustomed to offering—that the amendment would
have no effect on abortion, on the rights of homosexual persons, on family
structure, and so forth. The “superfluity problem” would not go away—
proponents had to proclaim the continuing need for an ERA despite advances under the Equal Protection Clause and through legislation.53 Creating new meanings for ERA II would obviate this problem, but at the
possibly fatal price of admitting that proponents wanted more than they had
acknowledged seeking.
All of these factors militated in favor of resting ERA II on ERA I’s
original legislative history, enshrined in the 1971 Yale Law Journal article
coauthored by Thomas Emerson and several feminist law students (the Yale
ERA Article).54 In this view, ERA II provided a second bite at the ratification apple and nothing more.
C. ERA II as the Dawn of a New Era
A third way of framing the debate over ERA II was to view it as an
opportunity to reassess the feminist legal agenda and to rethink the amendment’s constitutional meaning. This perspective embodied an acute recognition of how much had changed—legally as well as politically—since
Congress had first considered the ERA.55 Feminists began strategizing
about how to handle these changes almost immediately after the ERA’s reintroduction, but it was the congressional hearings themselves that forced
proponents to redefine the specific legal ramifications of their amendment
and thereby begin to retool a post-ERA feminist agenda.
53

See Mayeri, supra note 16, at 821; Siegel, supra note 8, at 1403–04.
Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights
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Many feminists were understandably reluctant to wade back into the
ERA fight. But once Congress began its hearings, ERA opponents accused
the amendment’s supporters of evading the true legal ramifications of the
amendment and forced them to provide detailed assessments of the amendment’s projected legal impact. What exactly would the judicial standard of
review be under an ERA? Precisely which laws would fail to survive judicial scrutiny? What was the true meaning of “equal rights under the law”?
To some degree, ERA proponents had faced these questions during the ratification debates, but the context was new—advocates now had the opportunity to rewrite the ERA’s legislative history in light of a decade of legal and
social change. Though they steadfastly maintained that an ERA was just as
necessary as it had been ten years earlier, feminists recognized that they
faced a transformed legal and political landscape that required them to reexamine the assumptions, elisions, and compromises of the 1970s.
When ERA opponents demanded specific answers to specific questions
about the ERA’s legal meaning, feminist organizations were compelled to
respond. This process forced feminists—and feminist lawyers in particular—to rethink what they wanted from the amendment, and from congressional consideration of the ERA. The reintroduction of the ERA provided a
focal point for feminist lawyers to strategize together—to take a cold, hard
look at the legal landscape, assess their options, and infuse the amendment
with new legal and political content. After a decade of asking what they
could do for the ERA, it was time for feminists to ask what the ERA could
do for them.
In attempting to create a new legislative history for the ERA, proponents of the amendment were addressing multiple audiences. Most immediately, they responded to queries from skeptical or even hostile legislators
like Senator Orrin Hatch, whose detailed questions were designed to highlight ambiguities that opponents warned were an invitation to judicial interpretation run amok.56 They also addressed pro-ERA legislators, many of
whom likely would have preferred to keep the debate at a high level of generality in order to reap maximum political gain and avoid grappling with the
difficult doctrinal details.57 A third important audience was internal: feminist lawyers and legal activists frustrated by ERA I’s defeat and by the
compromises that the ratification effort had required. Though feminists did
not necessarily agree on strategy or tactics, many came to see the creation
of a new legislative history as an opportunity, perhaps even an imperative,
to reassess their constitutional agenda. By 1982, the Yale ERA Article’s
exposition of the amendment’s meaning seemed outdated in its emphasis, if
56

This skepticism was nothing new, of course; Phyllis Schlafly and opponents of ERA I had similarly expressed scorn for the notion that legislative history would constrain judicial interpretation of the
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not its content. Feminists who wished for a more expansive ERA II—or
were forced to clarify the amendment’s meaning by determined questioning
from skeptics—could not avoid reconstructing its legislative history.
Finally, the attempted creation of a new legislative history for the
amendment ultimately anticipated a judicial audience.58 The legislative history feminists tried to create for ERA II contemplated that courts, when
called upon to interpret the ERA in future cases, would look to the debates
and legislative reports they hoped Congress would eventually produce.
During the debate over ERA I, the Yale ERA Article was widely viewed as
the definitive exposition of the amendment’s projected impact.59 Although
the ERA’s opponents exploited fears that courts would not be constrained
by the amendment’s legislative history, most of the disputants assumed that
legislative history would play some role in defining the ERA’s scope and
application to particular problems. If nothing else, persistent skepticism
from opponents about the courts’ likely fidelity to legislative history virtually compelled feminists to provide repeated reassurances that legislative
history would matter.60
On this third view, then, the reintroduction of the ERA offered feminists more than a second bite at the ratification apple; it offered them a
chance to redefine the amendment’s meaning, and feminists seized this opportunity. They engaged in lively debates over how the amendment could
improve women’s legal status given the sweeping and multivalent changes
of the 1970s. However, as they grappled with the questions presented by
pro- and anti-ERA legislators and with strategic disagreements within their
own ranks, feminists refined and sometimes scaled back their constitutional
aspirations. Thanks to the probing if sometimes disingenuous questions of
ERA skeptics and supporters, feminists were compelled to think carefully
about doctrinal intricacies they had preferred to leave vague during the ratification period. In the end, the legal meaning of ERA II was the evolving
product of a series of compromises. Those compromises reflected external
pressures from ERA opponents and legislators, as well as internal disagreements about how much a constitutional amendment could accomplish
58
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and about the role that the ERA should play in women’s rights advocacy after the ratification failure.
II. REDEFINING “EQUALITY OF RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW”
This Part recounts how feminists created a new constitutional meaning
for the ERA through combative dialogue with their opponents. It quickly
became clear that opponents would not allow feminists to promote the ERA
as an abstract guarantee of equality, but rather would force them to account
for the amendment’s concrete effects on law and jurisprudence. Nevertheless, feminists struggled with competing impulses as they contemplated
what kind of legislative history to create for ERA II. One possibility was to
continue to emphasize equality as an abstract principle, and when pressed
for details, stick with the positions taken in the first round of congressional
deliberations in 1971 and 1972, the option suggested above by Part I.B.
This position did not reflect satisfaction with the original legislative history,
but rather a belief that the ERA was not a capacious enough receptacle for
feminists’ legal and constitutional aspirations. In other words, this was a
conservative position not on the merits, but on the strategic questions proponents faced. The competing impulse, suggested by Part I.C, came from a
kind of ratification fatigue—a weariness of the endless compromises entailed by amendment advocacy and an eagerness to move beyond the constraints imposed by the debate over ERA I. According to this view,
drawing artificial lines between abortion and constitutional sex equality, for
example, was counterproductive and ultimately injurious to the causes of
reproductive rights and feminism. Focusing on the harm of explicit sexbased classifications made little sense in a world where most of these distinctions had been wiped off the books and yet sex-based inequality persisted. Ultimately, a new constitutional meaning for ERA II emerged out of
these warring impulses.
A. The Legal Backdrop: A Decade of Change
Much had changed since the debates over congressional passage of the
ERA in 1971 and 1972. At the federal level, feminist lawyers had persuaded the Supreme Court to scrutinize and invalidate many sex discriminatory laws.61 Statutes like Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978 provided the basis for lawsuits against private as well as public employers who discriminated on the basis of sex. Title IX forbade many
forms of sex discrimination in education. At the state level, an examination
of laws and policies that disadvantaged women was well under way, sometimes compelled by state constitutional changes—most prominently, state
61
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ERAs.62 The numbers of women pursuing traditionally male occupations,
including law, medicine, and even military service, increased steadily.63 As
scholars of the ERA’s failure recognize, these victories made arguing for
the amendment more difficult in the latter years of the ratification process.64
Changes in the law—both statutory and judge-made—between 1972 and
1982 removed many of the sex-based legal distinctions that the ERA originally was designed to vanquish. Political scientist Jane Mansbridge argued
just a few years later that by the time the ERA officially expired, the
amendment’s direct, short-term impact probably would have been limited.65
The reigning consensus within the legal academy today is that equal protection jurisprudence more or less incorporated ERA I’s precepts, and this interpretation earned now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s blessing in the late
1990s.66
To say that by 1982 feminists had achieved through other means much
of what the ERA was designed to accomplish is not to assert that feminists
were satisfied with the legal changes they had won, however—far from it.
In fact, the developments of the 1970s and early 1980s had themselves
transformed the meaning of equality for advocates concerned with women’s
legal status. In the first hearings on the amendment in 1971 and 1972, explicit sex-based classifications that limited women’s ability to break out of
traditional roles topped women’s rights advocates’ list of grievances.67
Now the crucial difference an ERA could make concerned the treatment of
sex-neutral laws that disproportionately disadvantaged women.68 In 1971
and 1972, the Supreme Court had only just begun to reconsider its traditionally deferential rational basis standard for reviewing sex-based classifications; by the early 1980s, the Court had struck down many sex-specific
laws69 and established a more rigorous standard of review: intermediate
62
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scrutiny.70 Whereas the ERA’s effect on affirmative action had not been a
prominent concern in the early 1970s, heated controversies over race-based
remedies and the nebulous constitutional status of sex-based affirmative action increased the issue’s salience.71 Abortion had played only a minor role
in the first set of hearings; however, a decade after Roe v. Wade,72 it was a
primary preoccupation of American politics. In the early 1970s, predictions
that an ERA would lead to same-sex marriage could be dismissed as absurd; by 1983 they no longer seemed quite so outlandish.
At the same time that they had succeeded in eliminating many of the
overtly sex discriminatory laws that had been the original targets of ERA I,
feminists’ success had certain limitations. Most prominently, the Supreme
Court had declared that discrimination based on pregnancy did not necessarily constitute discrimination based on sex in violation of the equal protection guarantee;73 that the Equal Protection Clause did not require that
women and men be treated equally with respect to draft registration74 or statutory rape laws;75 that a strong showing of discriminatory intent was necessary to establish an equal protection violation even if a law exerted a
dramatically disproportionate impact on women;76 and that federal and state
governments could deny funding for abortion services without running
afoul of the Constitution.77
As a practical matter, the changes feminists did achieve meant that the
overtly sex-based legal distinctions that remained on the books were often
the most entrenched and emotion-laden—restrictions on women’s participation in military service, including the exclusion of women from the draft
and from combat; laws that defined marriage as a union between a man and
a woman; and certain forms of sex separation, such as single-sex athletic
teams, sex education classes, prisons, dormitories, and restrooms. As historians of the ERA ratification controversy have explicated, these issues
played starring roles in the playbooks of ERA opponents. With the most
frightening specters of androgyny and sexual license looming, and many—
though certainly not all—of the ERA’s original targets vanquished, making
70
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a compelling argument that the ERA remained necessary and desirable all
but required a fresh account of the ERA’s legal impact.
The ratification debates had not been an auspicious time for calm deliberation over the amendment’s legal ramifications, however. Debates
over ratification became highly symbolic and focused on inflammatory social issues such as the military draft, abortion, the projected demise of the
traditional family, and homosexuality. ERA proponents lacked the centralization and organizational discipline of Schlafly’s STOP ERA movement.
They often found themselves in a defensive posture, compelled to spend
much of their time describing what the ERA would not do rather than the
positive changes it would bring. When proponents did attempt to invoke
the ERA’s legislative history to assuage the concerns of skeptics, they were
constrained to referring back to the 1971 and 1972 congressional debates,
which seemed increasingly distant now that judicial and legislative action
had addressed many of the discriminations ERA promoters identified in the
first place.78 Once the ERA had gone down in defeat, though, feminists
were at least partially liberated from these constraints. Now they could attempt a deliberate, coordinated reassessment of their legal agenda. In effect, they redefined the ERA to encompass many—though not all—of the
goals that had evolved out of the legal and political changes of the 1970s
and early 1980s. In the end, though, they could not wholly escape the political constraints that made the first ratification campaign so difficult, particularly once opponents interrogated them about the specific legal and
doctrinal ramifications of ERA II.79
B. “Equality in Theory” or “Equality in Fact”?
The hallmark of ERA II as constructed by a coalition of feminist lawyers and women’s organizations was a definition of discrimination that emphasized the central role played by sex-neutral laws in the perpetuation of
78
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women’s inferior legal, economic, and social status. In other words, feminists argued that the amendment would allow constitutional disparate impact challenges to laws that did not distinguish between men and women on
their face, but that nevertheless had a sex-based disproportionate effect.
The emergence of disparate impact analysis in the debate over ERA II underscored both the victories and the limitations of the legal changes that the
civil rights and women’s rights movements had secured during the 1970s.
The disparate impact question had not been prominent in the first congressional consideration of the ERA in part because overt sex-based classifications were numerous enough that they were the amendment’s primary
targets. Further, in the early 1970s the door was still open to an expansive
definition of actionable disparate impact under the Equal Protection Clause.
Not long after the ERA’s passage, feminists began to challenge veterans’
preference laws using an equal protection theory that minimized the role of
discriminatory intent and explicit sex classification. Washington v. Davis,80
in 1976, was the first case in which the Supreme Court defined discriminatory intent as the key element of equal protection violation. Even in the
wake of Davis, feminists won victories against some of the more extreme
veterans’ preference schemes in the lower courts.81 It was not until Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, in 1979, that the Court appeared to virtually
foreclose successful sex-based disparate impact challenges under the Equal
Protection Clause.82 Thus, only toward the end of the 1970s did it become
clear to feminists that they would have to look outside of the Equal Protection Clause—perhaps to the ERA—to combat disparate impact under the
federal Constitution.
By 1983, then, conditions were ripe for feminists to redefine the nature
of equality under the ERA. Feminists did not always advertise this transformation, but they did not back away from it either. In contrast to their
continued denials that the ERA would implicate abortion funding bans or
laws concerning homosexuality, proponents acknowledged—and at times
even emphasized—that the new ERA would call facially neutral laws into
question. The challenge for feminist lawyers was to define a legal standard
sufficiently rigorous to eliminate laws that perpetuated women’s subordinate status but limited enough to assuage concerns that a constitutional assault on facially neutral laws would subject virtually every state and federal
legislative act to judicial scrutiny.
1. “At Least Six Different ERAs”: The Standard of Review Controversy.—The standard of review that judges would apply under the ERA became a focus of congressional scrutiny almost as soon as Senate hearings
80
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on the amendment began in May 1983. The ERA’s primary Senate sponsor, Paul E. Tsongas (D-MA), was the first to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution, chaired by
conservative Senator Orrin Hatch. Tsongas cast his prepared statement in
general terms, attempting to allay concerns that the ERA would require the
sex-integration of restrooms and prisons, force women into combat positions for which they were unqualified, and coerce homemakers into the
workforce on pain of financial ruin. The very first question posed to a witness in the ERA II hearings was Hatch’s query to Tsongas: “What precisely, in your view, is the standard of review that the equal rights
amendment would establish for Federal and State legislation that employ
sex classifications?”83 But Tsongas declined to delve deeply into the legal
intricacies of the amendment. “There is no one who would argue that we
have at this point an exact understanding of where it will lead,” he said at
one point in the exchange.84 When Hatch then asked whether Tsongas
agreed that the analysis set out in the Yale ERA Article remained the “definitive statement” on the amendment’s meaning,85 Tsongas said he had not
read the article.86 Hatch followed up with a litany of specific questions
about the ERA’s projected legal impact on everything from abortion funding, to veterans’ preferences, to seniority systems, to single sex schools, to
maternity leave, to combat restrictions, to the legality of same-sex marriage.
Tsongas dodged them all, emphasizing that all constitutional amendments
contained some ambiguities and suggesting that Hatch had not subjected his
own proposed human life (antiabortion) amendment to such a rigorous
standard of certainty.87 The exchange grew heated. “You knew damn well
that these are specific issues, that no one coming here unprepared could answer,” Tsongas shot back at one point.88 The Associated Press described
Tsongas as “visibly shaken.”89 Though he continued to accuse Hatch of hypocrisy, Tsongas agreed to submit a detailed list of answers to Hatch’s
questions.
Thus, in the first hour of the first hearing, Hatch had both established
the agenda for the remaining hearings and created the impression that the
amendment’s proponents were long on platitudes and short on specifics.
Even some ERA sympathizers were aghast at Tsongas’s apparent inability
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to answer basic questions about the amendment’s meaning.90 It had become
painfully clear that ERA supporters faced a well-informed, legally sophisticated adversary and would be forced to articulate much more specifically
the amendment’s constitutional consequences.
Although Hatch’s portrayal of the proponents’ views as ambiguous at
best and evasive at worst was somewhat unfair, his professed confusion
over the standard of review that would apply under the ERA was not wholly
unreasonable. The ERA’s text itself did not specify a standard of review,
stating only that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.” The 1971
Yale ERA Article, which the Amendment’s supporters and opponents frequently cited as the most reliable predictor of the ERA’s impact, had set
forth an “absolute” standard, subject to three “qualifications,” sometimes
referred to colloquially as “exceptions.” If courts followed the Yale Article’s schema, laws that distinguished between individuals on the basis of
sex would be absolutely prohibited except (1) where they involved a physical characteristic unique to one sex;91 (2) where they were necessary to preserve other constitutional rights, such as the right of personal privacy;92 or
(3) where they were part of a genuine affirmative action policy designed to
remedy past discrimination.93 In each of these three exceptional instances,
the classificatory law would be subject to strict scrutiny: the requirement
that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.94
Frequently, however, during and after the ratification debates, both
friends and foes of the ERA characterized the applicable standard of review
as analogous to the standard applied to race-based classifications: strict
scrutiny. The analogy to race generally, and strict scrutiny in particular,
served as a kind of shorthand in part because strict scrutiny was usually, but
not always, fatal to the challenged law. Similarly, the Yale ERA Article
announced an absolute standard that in fact was subject to certain exceptions.95
Nevertheless, there were potentially significant substantive and symbolic differences between the absolute standard and a general application of
90
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(June 1983) (on file with NOW Papers, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University,
Box 191, Folder 45) (defending his own testimony, including his decisions to defer technical questions
to constitutional lawyers and to admit that courts would exert some control over the interpretation of the
ERA).
91
Yale ERA Article, supra note 54, at 893–95.
92
Id. at 900–02.
93
Id. at 903–05; see also discussion supra note 71.
94
Yale ERA Article, supra note 54, at 888–909.
95
Id.

1246

103:1223 (2009)

A New E.R.A. or a New Era?

strict scrutiny to all sex-based classifications. An absolute standard created
a bright-line rule for a certain category of classifications that did not fall
under any of the three exceptions. Strict scrutiny at least theoretically left
open the possibility that any sex-based classification might be upheld if the
government’s asserted objective was sufficiently compelling and the means
used to achieve that goal were necessary.96 Moreover, the absolute standard
carried particular symbolic weight because proponents perceived it to be
even more stringent than the standard applied to race-based classifications,
indicating to proponents a laudable seriousness about the gravity of sex discrimination missing from the Supreme Court’s intermediate scrutiny formulation.
Opponents framed the absolute standard as epitomizing the ERA’s inflexibility and its supporters’ fanatical devotion to androgyny.97 It was bad
enough that many proponents asserted that the ERA would treat sex like
race—to apply an even higher level of scrutiny added insult to injury. ERA
skeptics also chided proponents for failing to specify which standard of review would apply. After Tsongas and the second pro-ERA witness, attorney Marna Tucker, attempted to gloss over the issue, anti-ERA witness
Walter Berns of the American Enterprise Institute complained that “[w]hat
this [vagueness about the standard of review] implies is that it is not necessary to know what the language means because in due course the courts will
tell us what it means.”98 To leave something this important up to the courts,
Berns charged, was to “treat[] the Constitution with contempt.”99 The first
House hearing on ERA II, several weeks later, revealed continued confusion over the proper standard of review for sex-based classifications. AntiERA witness Grover Rees III, a professor at the University of Texas Law
School, opined that this ambiguity produced so many different possible interpretations that there were, in effect, “at least six different ERAs.”100 The
U.S. Civil Rights Commissioner and Howard University Professor Mary
Frances Berry immediately followed Rees and offered a definitive answer
96
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to the standard of review question. In response to a question from Representative Mike DeWine (R-OH), Berry testified that the standard would be
analogous to that applied to race-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause.101
Subsequent hearings in the House picked up on both the parallel to the
Fourteenth Amendment and the apparent inconsistencies in proponents’ testimonies about the proper standard of review. Phyllis Schlafly told the
House subcommittee on October 20, “To predict what will be the effect of
ERA in any area, just ask yourself, ‘how do we handle it in race?’ and you
will have the answer.”102 During the same hearing, former Representative
Charles Wiggins emphasized the importance of conclusively establishing
the standard of review, arguing that if Congress did not wish to embrace the
decisional law on race-based classifications, it should incorporate specific
exceptions into the committee reports and other legislative history.103 Representative DeWine expressed frustration with pro-ERA witnesses’ reluctance to clarify definitively the proper standard of review. Many of the
witnesses had deferred such questions, leaving them to others with greater
expertise in matters of constitutional doctrine. Said DeWine, “I just hope
that someday we get some witnesses in here, Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, who will talk about what the interpretation will be by the courts and
what the test [will be]. That is the tough question.”104
The chairman of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, Representative Don Edwards (D-CA), complied at a hearing one
week later, calling as witnesses constitutional scholars Thomas Emerson of
Yale and Ann Freedman of Rutgers. Emerson and Freedman were among
the five coauthors of the famous Yale ERA Article, and their testimony did
serve to clarify ERA proponents’ position on the proper standard of review
for sex-based classifications. Emerson eschewed the label “absolute,” noting that it had acquired “pejorative” connotations during the ERA ratification debates.105 But Emerson essentially reaffirmed the Yale ERA Article’s
general prohibition on facial sex classifications that did not fall under the
three exceptions—narrowly drawn affirmative action programs, unique
101
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physical characteristics, and conflicts with other constitutional provisions,
such as the right to privacy.106
But what was noteworthy about Emerson’s and Freedman’s testimony
before the House subcommittee was not so much their explication of the
appropriate standard of review for overt sex-based classifications, which in
practical terms had arguably become a distinction without a difference.107
Instead, by this point in the hearings it was clear that the most important
question about standards of review concerned not legal classifications explicitly based on sex, but rather sex-neutral laws and policies that had a sexbased disproportionate effect.
2. A “Theoretical Dilemma”: Disparate Impact Analysis and the
New ERA.—Feminist lawyers and activists immediately identified disparate
impact as one of the key issues they would need to address as they attempted to shape ERA II’s legislative history. “Disparate impact theory”
had been one of several areas “for further research” identified in March
1983 at a meeting for representatives of a coalition of feminist groups, including Eleanor Smeal, Judy Goldsmith, Catherine East, Phyllis Segal, and
Marsha Levick.108 Segal, an attorney with NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDEF), was charged with writing an initial memo laying out the
substantive and strategic issues involved. The threshold question, Segal realized, was whether ERA proponents should attempt to clarify the application of the amendment to sex-neutral laws that had a disproportionately
negative sex-based effect, or whether they should remain silent on the subject and leave ERA I’s sparse legislative history on the issue to speak for
them.109 In her memo, Segal laid out three options: doing nothing; “act[ing]
106
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halfway by stressing disparate impact problems in describing the need for
the ERA, without offering comments on the theoretical application or effect
of the ERA in such cases”; and “present[ing] direct argument on this.”110
Avoiding the issue could backfire, she suggested, by limiting the ERA’s
“potential as a legal tool.” Without further legislative history, there was a
“serious risk that the Supreme Court will not apply the ERA to disparate
impact cases, or will import an intent requirement” from equal protection
jurisprudence.111 Focusing exclusively on facial sex-based classifications
also ran the risk of “trivializ[ing] the problems of sex discrimination,” given
“the dwindling list of laws that discriminate on their face.”112 It would be
difficult to explain why the Equal Protection Clause did not suffice to address sex discrimination, unless the ERA would go significantly further
than the Fourteenth Amendment in resolving disparate impact cases.113 Putting the argument in more positive terms, Segal predicted that “expanding
the impact of the ERA will increase support.”114
Finally, Segal recognized that avoiding the issue was unrealistic:
“Even if proponents don’t focus [on] the issue [of disparate impact], a smart
‘undecided’ legislator, or opponents, will.”115 As if to prove Segal’s point,
Hatch raised the subject in the first Senate hearing on ERA II, asking Marna
Tucker whether “disparate impact analysis” would apply to the ERA.116
Tucker demurred, saying that she had not studied the issue.117 Feminist
lawyers realized they would have to be more forthcoming, but sought to
strike a balance between explication and obfuscation. As feminist legal
strategists discussed how to respond to the questions raised by Hatch in the
first hearing, they established a “format for answering” questions about disparate impact: “1. Ask for specificity in question: what exactly is the questioner asking re: ERA and specific issue raised. 2. Preface answer with
description of disparate impact this particular classification/issue has on
women.”118 Proponents would emphasize the discrimination the ERA was
meant to eradicate, and only address the legal technicalities of disparate impact analysis if pressed further.
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a. The search for a limiting principle.—As the feminist lawyers
constructed their strategy for responding to questions, they began to confront some of the challenges of articulating a theory of disparate impact that
would reach the discrimination they wished to vanquish without appearing
to be a radical and unworkable judicial intrusion on legislative decisionmaking. Because the range of laws exerting a sex-based disparate impact
seemed potentially infinite, establishing a workable limiting principle was
perhaps the most daunting challenge ERA proponents faced in formulating
a method of disparate impact analysis.
The starting point for constitutional disparate impact analysis was the
Supreme Court’s treatment of such cases under the Equal Protection Clause.
A finding of discriminatory intent was the primary limiting principle established by the Court in Davis and Feeney. Disparate impact alone would not
trigger heightened scrutiny absent evidence of discriminatory intent, according to Davis.119 Feminist lawyers had long emphasized that as difficult
as it was to prove discriminatory intent in the context of racial discrimination, it was virtually impossible to find such evidence in cases of sex discrimination.120 Yet the Court had in fact raised the bar even higher for sexbased disparate impact claims in Feeney. The majority in Feeney effectively rejected the more nuanced analysis of Davis in favor of a requirement
that, for a claim to succeed, the challenged law must have been enacted
“because of,” not just “in spite of” its adverse impact on women. Even the
dissenters in Feeney had not moved all that far away from an intent-based
inquiry.121 Justice Marshall wrote for himself and Justice Brennan that
Massachusetts’s absolute veterans’ preference “evinces purposeful genderbased discrimination,” and applied heightened scrutiny to the policy on that
basis.122 “[T]he critical constitutional inquiry is not whether an illicit consideration was the primary or but-for cause of a decision, but rather whether
it had an appreciable role in shaping a given legislative enactment,” Marshall opined, finding that among other factors, the “foreseeability” of the
drastically adverse impact on women provided sufficient evidence of discriminatory purpose to trigger suspicion.123
This “foreseeability” standard thus provided one possible limiting
principle that was less drastic than the Feeney majority’s analysis. ERA
proponents felt, however, that this standard still conceded too much to the
preoccupation with intent that characterized the Court’s equal protection
analysis. From the start, their objective was to eliminate the intent require119
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ment altogether. Intent was far from irrelevant, feminists stressed, but they
sought to ensure that evidence of a discriminatory purpose would be sufficient, rather than necessary, to trigger heightened scrutiny. Segal declared
in her March 1983 memo: “While purpose or intent to discriminate would
be definitive evidence to invalidate governmental action that has a disparate
impact on females (or males), such evidence is not required (as it is in
[equal protection] cases). This is the point that has not been articulated before.”124 Most laws that had a disparate impact on women were not the
product of deliberate malice, feminists argued, but of subtle attitudes and
entrenched stereotypes about gender roles that exhibited the same constitutional infirmities as laws that overtly classified men and women. As Segal
put it, “many rules that appear ‘neutral’ are designed essentially on worldview assumptions such as male wage worker/female childbearer-rearer role
distinctions.”125 Legal rules, moreover, often were “built on male norms,”
but the “process of designing such ‘male-centered’ rules rarely includes—
and more rarely provides evidence of—overt discriminatory intent.”126
But if feminists were unwilling to include an intent requirement—even
in the more relaxed register of “foreseeability”—then they lacked a principle by which to limit the applicability of disparate impact analysis. As
Segal recognized, they faced a “theoretical dilemma”: “the measure of
when ‘disparate impact’ is sufficient to trigger ERA scrutiny . . . . This may
of necessity be an issue left to future interpretation when the ERA is (at
long last) implemented.”127 However, ERA skeptics would not let proponents defer such questions indefinitely, particularly once witnesses took advantage of the more ERA-friendly atmosphere of the House hearings to
highlight the ERA’s potential to attack disparate impact cases. In the second House hearing, held September 14, 1983, Tish Sommers of the Older
Women’s League emphasized how disparate impact analysis could combat
sex discriminatory effects of Social Security and ERISA rules, pension
schemes, and divorce laws on older women.128 NOW President Judy Goldsmith emphasized the difficulty, if not impossibility, of rooting out sex inequality under a discriminatory intent requirement, and detailed how
assumptions about women’s economic dependency worked to their detriment in areas like employment, Social Security, pensions, and insurance
rates.129 League of Women Voters President Dorothy Ridings observed that
“facially neutral policies” often perpetuated “occupational segregation,”
discrimination in education and training, and contributed to the “feminiza-
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tion of poverty.”130 She touted the ERA’s requirement of “rigorous scrutiny” of “rules and policies that appear to be gender-neutral but which have
had disproportionately negative effects on women.”131 In the question and
answer session that followed, Representative DeWine asked Goldsmith to
clarify the pro-ERA position: “I think you are telling me, that we are going
to look at the result of law . . . at how it applies, in fact. Is that a fair summary of what is involved?” Goldsmith replied, “That is correct . . . .”
DeWine responded, “So we would not have to prove intent; we would not
look to intent?” Goldsmith’s answer was unequivocal: “Exactly.”132
In the absence of a limiting principle to replace discriminatory intent,
opponents could attack disparate impact theory as a boundless enterprise
that, taken to its logical conclusion, contained limitless possibilities for undermining the legal and social order. The topic of disparate impact analysis
arose most frequently in connection with substantive areas such as military
regulations, veterans’ employment preferences, family law, abortion funding, and government benefits programs, especially Social Security. Each of
these applications not only called into question entrenched assumptions
about gender differences, but also appeared potentially to wreak havoc on
the existing system of laws and regulations. Opponents often used hyperbolic language to forecast the ERA’s effects, but they also raised legitimate
questions about the outer boundaries of disparate impact theory. Grappling
with the objections of critics forced ERA proponents more specifically to
define the limits of the disparate impact principle.
In arguing for a disparate impact theory of equal rights unbound to discriminatory intent, feminists first had to assure skeptics that their analysis
would not subject every statute that had different impacts upon men and
women to constitutional challenge.133 One oft-cited example was the progressive income tax. Since men’s incomes were, as a group, higher than
women’s, a progressive income tax disproportionately burdened men in a
way that was easily foreseeable, if not inevitable.134
Feminists could have attempted to quantify the degree of disparate impact necessary to trigger special judicial scrutiny. They chose instead a qualitative definition.
Rather than suggesting that all laws that
disproportionately affected one sex were automatically suspect, proponents
adopted a formulation that tied the application of heightened scrutiny to a
particular type of disparate impact: that which, in the words of Ann Freedman, was “traceable to and reinforces, or perpetuates, discriminatory pat-
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terns similar to those associated with facial discrimination.”135 Because the
Court had already tackled many instances of facial discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause, Freedman could draw extensively from the language of the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in characterizing those “discriminatory patterns.”136 She then explained that the
progressive income tax would not be vulnerable under this standard “because the disparate impact of the income tax on men is not the product of
habit or stereotypical ways of thinking about the sexes.”137 Freedman took
the analysis one step further, attributing significance to the fact that the progressive income tax had redistributive consequences that “ameliorate[d]”
sex inequality.138
b. Applying the antihierarchy approach to family law.—This antihierarchical or ameliorative approach to disparate impact analysis reflected feminists’ frustration with a conception of equal rights that appeared
ultimately to benefit men. When NOW President Goldsmith described the
need for the ERA to incorporate disparate impact analysis, she stressed the
failure of equal protection jurisprudence to address sex discrimination’s
particular toll on women. “Historically, in light of the Fourteenth Amendment, sex discrimination that disadvantages men is far more likely to be
found unconstitutional than sex discrimination harming women,” she told
the committee.139 However, the Court’s emphasis on the harmful effects of
sex stereotyping on both men and women created a potential tension between an antistereotyping impulse and the antihierarchical principle. Nowhere was this tension more apparent than in the realm of family law.
Visions of babies torn from their mothers’ breasts and homemakers
forced to leave their children to go to work at low-wage jobs populated the
imaginations of critics of disparate impact theory’s application to family
law. Apocalyptic images of family breakdown, already tediously familiar
135
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the home and the rearing of the family’ and not ‘for the marketplace and the world of ideas,’ and ‘assumptions that women are the weaker sex or are more likely to be childrearers or dependents’; the invidious relegation of classes of women ‘to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities’
of individual women; the ‘nineteenth century presumption that females are inferior to males’; and the
willingness to create gender-based hierarchies that keep women ‘in a stereotypic and predefined place’
and grant men more responsible and remunerative positions.” (footnotes omitted)).
137
Id. at 789.
138
Id. at 789–90.
139
Id. at 259 (testimony of NOW presented by Judy Goldsmith, President). Goldsmith was apparently referring to the 1970s sex discrimination cases brought by male plaintiffs. See, e.g., Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). Her comment may
have also reflected the Court’s failure to recognize discrimination against women in cases like Feeney.
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from the ERA ratification debates, undoubtedly were overblown. As even
Brigham Young University law professor Lynn Wardle, a staunch opponent
of the amendment, conceded, the ERA “would accelerate the adoption of
many beneficial reforms in existing family laws in order to equalize the
general rights and obligations of fathers and mothers and husbands and
wives.”140 Once the strident rhetoric was stripped away, much of the disagreement between proponents and opponents did concern, as Wardle contended, the desirability of eliminating legal incentives for women to forego
careers and pursue traditional roles as mothers and wives.141 Although
Schlafly and others regularly accused feminists of denigrating housewives,
feminist lawyers had actually devoted considerable time, energy, and resources to addressing the legal plight of homemakers, particularly at divorce.142 Feminists saw homemakers as caught in a no-win situation—a
legal framework designed to encourage traditional roles, but that provided
little if any protection to the wife in a traditional marriage gone awry.
While many antifeminist critiques unfairly impugned feminists’ motives
and distorted the extent to which existing law truly protected homemakers,
the application of disparate impact analysis to family law nevertheless
raised some vexing conceptual problems.
Child custody decisionmaking provides one example of the dilemmas
raised by disparate impact theory’s application to family law. By 1983 and
1984, it seemed clear that the ERA would invalidate laws and practices that
automatically granted a preference to mothers in child custody decisionmaking. The maternal preference, which sometimes took the form of the
“tender years doctrine”—the presumption, given varying degrees of weight,
that mothers were the best custodians for young children—was already on
its way out in many jurisdictions, and joint custody was becoming increasingly common. Some feminists, like Women’s Legal Defense Fund staff
attorney Nancy Polikoff, argued that judicial biases unfairly disadvantaged
mothers, not fathers, in custody cases. Polikoff favored a “primary caretaker” standard that would reward the investment of mothers in childrearing.143 This primary caretaker standard raised a disparate impact question: it
140

Senate Hearings, Part II, supra note 79, at 3 (statement of Lynn Wardle, Professor of Law, J.
Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University).
141
Id. (“Many people believe that there are other differences between men and women than just
physical differences, that there are emotional differences and psychological differences, differences in
the way that they nurture and relate to children, and that those differences ought to be taken into account
or at least States ought to be allowed to take those differences into account in establishing family law.”).
142
For a critical account of feminists’ focus on homemakers, see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY 53–75 (1991).
143
See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in
Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 235 (1982); see also Garska v. McCoy,
278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) (rare case adopting primary caretaker standard); Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the
Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789 (questioning the benefits to women
of a formal equality approach to family law decisionmaking).
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seemed likely if not certain that facially sex-neutral decision rules that emphasized the best interests of the child or favored the “primary caretaker”
would result in more mothers than fathers receiving custody because, as an
empirical matter, they were far more involved in caring for children during
marriage.144
The implications of the antistereotyping and antihierarchical principles
in the custody context were not entirely clear. On the one hand, a father’s
claim that custody decisions, even if ostensibly sex-neutral, exerted a sexbased disproportionate impact on men seemed consistent with feminists’
contention that even facially sex-neutral laws stemmed from and reinforced
the sex stereotypes that relegated women to the home and accorded men exclusive access to the “marketplace and the world of ideas.”145 If women’s
inferior economic position derived at least in part from their disproportionate responsibility for child-rearing, which in turn aggravated the adverse financial impact of divorce, then a system that effectively favored women’s
claims to custody might not only be unfair to men, but might in fact be contrary to women’s interests—particularly if accompanied by weak enforcement of the noncustodial parent’s child support obligations. On the other
hand, altering the best interests of the child standard in a manner that would
devalue women’s investment in childrearing after the fact seemed clearly
detrimental to individual women and, potentially, to children.
Perhaps in part to deflect concerns about the applicability of disparate
impact analysis to areas like child custody, feminists tended to emphasize
property management and distribution rules as the primary targets of disparate impact analysis in the family law context. In this area, the tension between combating assumptions about the proper roles of men and women
while acknowledging the social reality of disparate participation in childrearing and homemaking activities seemed less acute. Feminists stood on
somewhat firmer theoretical ground when they asserted that the ERA would
undermine property distribution rules that undervalued homemakers’ contributions to the household. Challenging the distribution of financial resources between husbands and wives fit more comfortably with the
antihierarchy principle because women were clearly the disadvantaged parties in jurisdictions that maintained title-based property distribution rules or
otherwise failed to account for nonmonetary contributions in dividing property at dissolution. Applying disparate impact analysis to these distributive
rules also allowed feminists to highlight how the ERA would bolster the
position of homemakers. A similar analysis applied to alimony awards.
When Senator Hatch asked NOW LDEF attorney Marsha Levick whether a
144

For a contemporaneous empirical analysis of child custody awards, see, for example, Lenore J.
Weitzman & Ruth B. Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child
Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471 (1979).
145
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975) (“No longer is the female destined solely for the
home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.”).
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jurisdiction that gave a disproportionate number of alimony awards to
women would be subject to a disparate impact challenge, she could reply
that no, “an increased number of support awards to women in the event that
those awards were appropriately extended could not be considered to be
discrimination against men. In fact, what they would be doing would be attempting to ameliorate the effects of discrimination against women.”146
When anti-ERA activists accused feminists of devaluing homemaking, feminists protested that, in fact, the amendment would give homemakers additional protection both during marriage and at divorce. But, as the child
custody example revealed, the tension between compensating women for
their contributions to the household and upending legal rules that reinforced
traditional gender roles was not easily overcome by a simple application of
the antihierarchy principle.
c. Veterans’ preferences, social services, and the ghost of equal
protection.—The antihierarchy principle did, at least in theory, limit disparate impact analysis to laws and policies that disadvantaged women. In the
case of veterans’ employment preferences, perhaps the most prominent
arena in which feminists promoted the disparate impact theory, the burden
on women could hardly have been more pronounced. To ERA opponents,
however, the veterans’ preference example proved too much because any
government program that provided special benefits to veterans inevitably
would benefit men almost exclusively. Opponents seized on this issue in
the hearings: some suggested that disparate impact analysis would invalidate not only absolute veterans’ preference programs like the one at issue in
Feeney, but all preferences for veterans in employment, and would even
call into question the validity of veterans’ benefits programs more generally.147
Such predictions were, of course, calculated to cause maximal political
consternation, but they also raised salient questions about the scope of disparate impact theory. The veterans’ preference issue was a mixed blessing
for ERA proponents. Since the only Supreme Court case to address a constitutional sex-based disparate impact claim concerned veterans’ preferences and it was one of several specific targets of ERA II, proponents
tended to use the Massachusetts program upheld in Feeney as an example of
how disparate impact analysis would apply. Because the lower courts in
146

Senate Hearings, Part II, supra note 79, at 76 (statement of Marsha Levick, Legal Director,
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund). In addition to emphasizing areas in which the “amelioration
of discrimination” argument was more straightforward, ERA proponents also referred to cases decided
under state ERAs to answer opponents’ charges that the disparate impact standard would wreak havoc
on family law in general, and child custody decisionmaking in particular. For instance, when Wardle
cited child custody as an example of how disparate impact theory might apply to allow men to challenge
custody regimes that resulted in fewer fathers receiving custody, Levick pointed to two Colorado cases
in which courts rejected such arguments under the state’s ERA. Id. at 77.
147
See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 79, at 299–300; Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at
681–86; see also Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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Feeney had engaged in the kind of factfinding that proponents envisioned
occurring under the ERA, it provided a handy concrete application of what
could often seem like an abstract theory.148 Further, the “absolute” nature of
the Massachusetts preference enabled proponents to distinguish the program from other veterans’ preference schemes less burdensome to women.
But the specificity of the Massachusetts example did not succeed in deflecting difficult questions about the reach of the disparate impact theory to other benefits for veterans and to the provision of government benefits and
services more generally.
ERA proponents approached disparate impact analysis of government
benefit provisions cautiously. For one thing, the issue was entangled with
the complicated and politically fraught questions surrounding the exclusion
of pregnancy from disability benefit coverage and the denial of Medicaid
funding for abortion.149 For another, feminists were wary of defining actionable disparate impact too narrowly. Still, charges from veterans’ groups
that disparate impact analysis ultimately would threaten all kinds of government support for veterans150 led ERA proponents to distinguish employment preferences from other policies benefiting veterans. NOW LDEF
attorney Phyllis Segal began her Senate testimony on veterans’ programs by
drawing a distinction between benefits “funded from the public treasury
[that] do not impose any direct costs on individuals,” on the one hand, and
civil service employment preferences, whose “burden[s] fall[] directly on
those individuals who are denied jobs or promotions because they do not
have veteran status.”151
The flip side of the question—the denial of social services, such as
welfare benefits, that disproportionately impacted women—also proved
tricky. As University of North Carolina law professor Judith Welch Wegner put it in her Senate testimony, how to view the disparate impact caused
by “[d]ecisions to deny certain types or levels of social services” was “perhaps the most troublesome” question facing theorists of disparate impact
discrimination.152 In the end, Wegner fell back on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in race cases in an effort to assuage concerns that the ERA
would subject legislative funding decisions to endless constitutional scru148

See Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976), question certified by Massachusetts v. Feeney, 429 U.S. 66 (1976), vacated, Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 U.S. 884 (1977), remanded to Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978), rev’d, Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
149
For more on the abortion controversy, see infra Part II.D.
150
See, e.g., Letter from A. Leo Anderson, Washington, DC Liaison Officer, National Association
of State Directors of Veterans Affairs to Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Oct. 17, 1983), reprinted in
Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 762.
151
Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 765–66 (statement on the impact of the Equal Rights
Amendment on veterans programs by Phyllis N. Segal).
152
Id. at 890 (statement of Judith Welch Wegner, Professor, University of North Carolina School of
Law).
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tiny. She cited decisions like NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., in which the
Third Circuit upheld a medical center’s decision to relocate to the suburbs
notwithstanding its adverse impact on inner-city minority communities,
surmising that courts would “demonstrate sensitivity to legislative resourceallocation decisions” under the ERA as well.153
d. Disparate impact and military employment: Title VII as a limiting principle.—If equal protection jurisprudence helped to limit the
reach of disparate impact analysis in the realm of social services cuts, when
it came to military employment, feminists imported principles from Title
VII cases to assure skeptics that the ERA would not upend military preparedness. In the military context, where the invalidity of explicit sex-based
classifications was a hard enough pill to swallow, a disparate impact analysis suggested to some ERA skeptics that the amendment would effectively
require women to make up fifty percent of draftees and even combat soldiers. Delaware Law School professor William A. Stanmeyer declared that
disparate impact analysis would “require that one-half the eligible married
women be drafted, while their husbands stay home, and in many cases take
care of the baby.”154 Less dramatically and perhaps more credibly, other
witnesses predicted that the ERA would precipitate a lowering of physical
standards when such standards were found disproportionately to exclude
women from certain positions. The effects of such a lowering of standards
on military readiness could be devastating, a number of witnesses suggested.155
These arguments placed ERA proponents in something of a bind.
Military service was not, in fact, one of the areas in which disparate impact
analysis was most necessary—in the military, explicit sex-based classifications remained prevalent, and their removal would be revolutionary enough.
Proponents stressed that their goal was not to lower standards; in fact, they
emphasized, judging individuals based upon their actual abilities rather than
their sex would actually enhance merit-based decisionmaking. As one internal memo stated the proponents’ position, “What ERA would establish is
a policy by which men and women are assigned to positions based upon
their individual abilities rather than upon a sex-based classification.”156
Military servicewomen testified in the congressional hearings that eradicat153

Id. at 891 (citing NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981); Jennings v. Alexander, 715 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1983)). Note that these were Title VI and Rehabilitation Act cases,
respectively.
154
House Hearings, supra note 79, at 653 (testimony of Professor William A. Stanmeyer on the
impact of the ERA on the military).
155
See, e.g., id. at 649–64 (testimony of William A. Stanmeyer on the impact of the ERA on the
military); id. at 668–70 (statement of Brigadier General Elizabeth P. Hoisington (USA, Ret.)); id. at
671–81 (statement of Mary Lawlor).
156
Memorandum from Ethan Naftalin to Sana Shtasel (June 8, 1983) (on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, Box 23, Folder 31).
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ing explicit sex-based discrimination would enable the armed forces to fulfill their personnel needs more efficiently and effectively, because they
could draw from a larger pool of potential service members. ERA proponents wished to make clear that they were not seeking lower standards, but
simply bare-bones equal opportunity. They needed, therefore, to place
some limit on the reach of disparate impact analysis in the military context.
As Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL) attorney Jeanne Atkins put it
in a preparatory memo to pro-ERA witness and former Undersecretary of
the Air Force Antonia Chayes, “[A]s the hearings move along it becomes
clearer that the constitutional law must be made clear.”157
The antihierarchical or “amelioration of discrimination” approach was
less useful as a limiting principle when it came to the military. Although
women’s exclusion from the draft and combat could have been interpreted
as benign, ERA advocates had long ago decided to frame those exclusions
as discriminatory.158 Once explicit sex-based distinctions were removed,
presumably facially sex-neutral physical requirements could effectively exclude many if not most women from certain positions. This seemed a classic instance of disparate impact discrimination that perpetuated old sex
classifications in the guise of gender neutrality. Because they could not rely
on the antihierarchy principle to cabin the reach of disparate impact analysis
in the military context, feminists agreed that heightened scrutiny would apply to physical requirements that disproportionately excluded willing women from positions in the service, but argued that the means-ends test itself
left room for truly necessary physical standards and requirements.
Strict scrutiny, on this account, would not be fatal in fact but rather
would bear a striking resemblance to Title VII’s job-relatedness requirement. Jeanne Paquette Atkins, staff attorney at WEAL and project associate at the National Information Center on Women and the Military, told the
House subcommittee in October 1983,
[T]o the extent that such gender-neutral criteria might disproportionately exclude women from participation, those criteria would be subject to rigorous
examination. Congress would be obligated to assure that such standards were
indeed job-related, that is, that the qualities measured were necessary to the efficient performance of the military role in question.159

Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) attempted to translate Atkins’s
testimony into a recognizable legal standard: “[What] you are saying is that
the Equal Rights Amendment does not eliminate job-related qualifications
157

Letter from Jeanne Atkins to Antonia Chayes (Sept. 21, 1983) (on file with Sterling Memorial
Library, Yale University, Thomas Emerson Papers, Box 23, Folder 344).
158
See Jane Mansbridge, Who’s in Charge Here? Decision by Accretion and Gatekeeping in the
Struggle for the ERA, 13 POL. & SOC’Y 343 (1984).
159
House Hearings, supra note 79, at 566 (statement of Jeanne Paquette Atkins, Staff Attorney,
Women’s Equity Action League, and Project Associate, the National Information Center on Women and
the Military).
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. . . like under standards set forth in the [Griggs v.] Duke Power case and
other cases that have established the law in this area.”160 At a Senate hearing several days later, Chayes indicated in her testimony that ERA proponents were willing to accept that many physical requirements in the military
were in fact job-related. Questioned pointedly by Senator Hatch about the
cryptic reference to disparate impact in the 1971 Yale ERA Article, which
seemed to him to suggest the invalidation of most military physical standards, Chayes replied, “There has been a long history of disparate impact
[analysis] since Professor Emerson wrote. I think we have got to accept the
consequences of the job relatedness of the requirements. I am prepared to
accept it as I think most ERA proponents are.”161 This was a significant
concession, given that presumably it would not be difficult to assert the jobrelatedness of virtually all physical requirements in the military.162
e. The remedial dilemma.—The controversial nature of disparate impact analysis did not only concern how disparate impact would be
defined or what standard of review would apply. ERA skeptics also pushed
proponents to articulate how laws and policies exerting a disparate impact
would have to be revised to remedy their discriminatory effects. For instance, in the veterans’ preference context, proponents could refer to the
Feeney dissent, which left room for less discriminatory alternatives, including less extreme or “absolute” employment preferences for veterans.
Moreover, because states other than Massachusetts had veterans’ preference
programs that ERA proponents claimed would withstand constitutional
scrutiny, concrete examples of solutions to the disparate impact problem
were available. However, in other areas of the law, less discriminatory alternatives were more elusive, difficult to define, or politically fraught.
The debate over disparate impact’s application to Social Security illustrates this problem. ERA proponents’ critique of the Social Security system
highlighted the ways in which assumptions that men would be family
breadwinners and women dependent homemakers—or at most secondary
wage-earners—disadvantaged women by perpetuating their dependence
upon men, and in some cases, threatening them with destitution in the event
of divorce or a husband’s premature death. ERA opponents disputed every
aspect of feminists’ analysis, arguing that, if anything, Social Security rules
benefited women more than men.163 Perhaps the most difficult questions
were those about how Congress could bring the Social Security system into
160

Id. at 593 (statement of Representative Patricia Schroeder).
Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 360–61 (statement of Antonia Handler Chayes).
162
Proponents did not introduce into the debate the concept of “business necessity,” an important
component of Title VII disparate impact doctrine.
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See, e.g., Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 811–75. Though the details are complicated,
the dispute essentially boiled down to how the witnesses were defining advantage and disadvantage, and
which women were the objects of concern. The Social Security system arguably disadvantaged twoearner households as compared to single-earner households, thereby incentivizing homemaking.
161
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compliance with the ERA. Moreover, when pressed for specifics, proponents faced a choice between proposing very controversial solutions—such
as a homemaker’s tax or “earnings sharing”164—or declining to specify what
solution Congress should adopt. For the most part, proponents chose the
latter option, insisting that Congress would have discretion to choose whichever less discriminatory alternative legislators thought best.165
ERA skeptics were concerned that remedying disparate impact discrimination might require overhauling or bankrupting the Social Security
system, but they were even more disturbed by the association between disparate impact and affirmative action, and by extension, “quotas” and other
controversial racial policies like “forced busing” and voting rights remedies.
These associations made even congressional supporters of the new ERA
wary of disparate impact’s political implications. The ERA Legislative
History Project’s coordinator Sally Burns wrote to her colleagues in early
October 1983, “Pro senators still resist the effects test and keep trying to
persuade us that a foreseeable consequences test achieves the same result.”166 The senators’ lack of responsiveness to feminists’ argument that
the “foreseeability” standard did not go far enough led Burns to believe that
“they are more concerned with the political objections to the effects test.”167
She noted, “The senators with whom we have so [far] met predict that effects [analysis] will conjure forced busing and no at large voting districts.”168 As Burns saw it, feminists were caught in something of a Catch22: “[A]s a reason to reject the effects test we are faced with racism on the
one hand and with the equation that our no intent standard means that we
seek a standard higher than race on the other.”169 As the next section describes, the amendment’s friends and foes battled over the ERA’s relationship to affirmative action on the familiar but fraught terrain of race.
164

Both of these proposals were attempts to resolve what feminists perceived as the Social Security
system’s bias against two-earner households. Earnings sharing “would allocate half of a couple’s combined earnings during marriage to each spouse for purposes of calculating Social Security benefits.”
Goodwin Liu, Social Security and the Treatment of Marriage: Spousal Benefits, Earnings Sharing, and
the Challenge of Reform, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1, 3. A homemaker’s tax could presumably have taken a
variety of forms, but its purpose was apparently to place a monetary value on homemaking work so that
married women working outside the home would not be subject to greater income tax burdens than homemakers.
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See, e.g., Memorandum from Marsha Levick to NOW-NOW LDEF ERA Legislative History
Committee, supra note 107, at 4 (“Would ERA require a homemaker’s tax for Social Security? Without
stating specifically what ERA might require, it does seem clear that the disparate effect which our present social security system has on the economic status and rights of women would require some congressional reform of that system.”).
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Memorandum from Sarah E. Burns, ERA Legislative History Project, to ERA Attorneys 1 (Oct.
4 1983) (on file with Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, Thomas Emerson Papers, Box 23,
Folder 344).
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Id.
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3. “Trying to Have Your Cake and Eat It Too”: Affirmative Action.—Just as proponents quickly realized that they would need to tackle the
subject of disparate impact discrimination in congressional hearings on
ERA II, they understood early on that the amendment’s relationship to affirmative action required clarification. When women’s rights advocates
consulted Tom Emerson about their strategy for the new ERA hearings, he
emphasized the heightened importance of this issue, which had received little attention during the hearings in 1971 and 1972.170 The potential effect of
the ERA on affirmative action remained somewhat obscure during the ratification period.171 Proponents often avoided questions about affirmative action, and when they did answer them, they frequently vacillated between
declaring that the ERA banned all sex classifications regardless of intent,
and alluding vaguely to Title VII as a model for analyzing affirmative action under the amendment. At the same time, in litigation under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, feminists were attempting
to distinguish between the sorts of “benign” or “protective” classifications
that they believed were the product of sex stereotypes and assumptions
about women’s and men’s proper roles, and “genuine affirmative action”
designed to achieve equality between men and women.172 This dilemma
persisted in debates over ERA II, as members of Congress sought clarification of proponents’ position on the definition of “equality of rights” under
the amendment.
But whereas in the first congressional ERA campaign opponents focused on the amendment’s potential to eviscerate “protective” or “benign”
laws, in this second round that objection was far less frequent than its inverse: that the ERA would effectively require affirmative action, or “quotas.” In the first ERA debate, opponents emphasized the amendment’s
alleged rigidity—its absolute commitment to equality that made no allowances for benignly intended protections; now they complained that the ERA
would mandate not merely equality of opportunity, but equality of results.
At the same time that opponents expressed doubt about the clarity of proponents’ distinction between “benign classifications,” which the ERA
would prohibit, and permissible “affirmative action,” opponents tacitly acknowledged the difference between them by tolerating the first—even
mourning their demise—while opposing the second.
ERA proponents identified affirmative action as one of several areas
“for further research” in March 1983 as they prepared for new congressional hearings. In a memorandum to her colleagues, Phyllis Segal made
170

Memorandum from Sally Burns, ERA Legislative History Project, to the Attorneys for the ERA
and Working Groups for the ERA (July 19, 1983) (on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute,
Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, Box 23, Folder 31).
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See MAYERI, supra note 120.
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See id.; Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789,
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clear that the validity of at least some form of affirmative action under the
ERA was beyond question. “Obviously,” she wrote, “applying the ‘absolute prohibition’ concept of scrutiny in such situations would elevate
‘equality in theory’ over ‘equality in fact.’ Where differential treatment is
targeted to achieve equality it should survive scrutiny under the ERA.”173
She explained that the ERA’s original legislative history, federal equal protection jurisprudence, and state ERA caselaw were all consistent with this
view, but that several points needed to be “clarified and stressed” in the
second round of hearings. First, Segal wrote, proponents needed to clarify
that the definition of affirmative action included efforts “designed to bring
about equality (not as compensation, but as agent for change).”174 This, she
emphasized, entailed not just the goal of “more participation” by women,
“but also efforts to modify policies that appear neutral but are not. This is
the flip side of the disparate impact memo discussion—another way to accomplish a broader view of equality.”175 Affirmative action was an important legal tool for remedying not only facial discrimination, but also more
subtle forms of bias and structural inequality.
While ERA proponents still faced the old challenge of distinguishing
between allegedly compensatory classifications that in fact reinforced stereotypical views of women as dependents and truly remedial policies,
changes in the legal and political climate since 1972 also required them to
respond to charges that affirmative action for women unfairly discriminated
against men and undermined meritocratic ideals.176 Segal hoped that “reinforcing and clarifying the treatment of affirmative action under the ERA
might avoid the protracted reverse discrimination challenges that [were] being litigated in race cases under the [Equal Protection Clause].”177 She requested “[a]dditional analysis . . . to develop the points which would be
helpful in this regard.”178
As they had begun to do during the ratification struggle, ERA opponents seized every opportunity to suggest that the amendment would lead
down a slippery slope to not merely encouraging, but requiring equal outcomes for men and women, even in contexts where most Americans believed sex differences were, if not immutable, enduring and perhaps even
desirable. Opponents immediately grasped the connection between disparate impact analysis and affirmative action, grouping both under the rubric
173

Memorandum from Phyllis Segal to ERA Legislative History Project, supra note 109, at 1.
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of “equal results.”179 They frequently raised the specter of “quotas” as the
likely if not inevitable result of the ERA, especially in light of developments in the race context. Professor Wardle warned that the concept of quotas would creep even into family law:
Thirty years ago, when the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, no one would have believed you if you had said that in order to achieve
racial equality you would set up racial quotas. Thirty years from now we may
look back and be saying the same sort of things about sexual equality in family
relations, custody, alimony.180

The case of United Steelworkers v. Weber181 was the opponents’ favorite
example of unintended consequences in this regard. The congressional
sponsors of Title VII had not envisioned that the statute would permit affirmative action by employers, yet the Court had validated just such practices in Weber.182 As Professor Rees put it in one of the later Senate
hearings on ERA II, “in the famous example of the Weber case and other
cases, the [C]ourt has simply explained away one part of the legislative history . . . .”183 For the most part, ERA skeptics did not even bother to explain
why such developments were undesirable; merely raising the specter of quotas and referring to experience with affirmative action under the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII was, for them, a case of res ipsa loquitur.
While to opponents the race cases served as a cautionary tale of courts
run amok, ERA proponents embraced them—but not because the race pre179

In the first hearing on ERA II, Senator Hatch seized on the suggestion in the 1971 Yale ERA Article that admissions qualifications for the military would have to be structured so that they did not exclude more women than men, remarking, “It seems to me that [this] concept of equal opportunity is
straight affirmative action analysis.” Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 67 (testimony of Senator
Orrin G. Hatch). In explicating the “six different Equal Rights Amendments” he asserted could result
from the amendment, Grover Rees III “lump[ed] together . . . for convenience of discussion” the “equal
protection principles that have been labeled the ‘equal outcomes model,’ the ‘equal respect model,’ and
the ‘affirmative action model,’” arguing that “[t]he shift in focus from a prohibition of purposeful discrimination to differential impact” implicated all of these consequences. House Hearings, supra note
79, at 27, 29 (statement of Grover Rees III, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of
Law). Rees argued that proponents’ promotion of an “effects test,” would make the ERA “an affirmative action amendment, not just an individual rights amendment.” Id. at 25. Anti-ERA witness Edward
Erler, called by Hatch to testify at a hearing devoted to “defining discrimination” agreed. “[T]he argument about ERA is no longer an argument about equal rights, but an argument about equal results. Under ERA, proportionality will necessarily be the test of gender discrimination.” Senate Hearings, Part I,
supra note 83, at 877, 895 (statement of Edward J. Erler, Professor, National Endowment for the Humanities).
180
Senate Hearings, Part II, supra note 79, at 78 (testimony of Lynn D. Wardle, Professor of Law,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University).
181
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
182
For a discussion of congressional intent with respect to affirmative action and Title VII, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 321, 328–32 (1990).
183
Senate Hearings, Part II, supra note 79, at 187 (testimony of Grover Rees III, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law).
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cedents provided a particularly expansive template for affirmative action for
women. Indeed, to proponents, cases like Bakke184 stood for the limits on,
rather than the possibilities of, affirmative action. Strict scrutiny was a
more stringent standard than that which applied to sex-based classifications,
including those arguably designed to promote sex equality. Liberal Justices
and advocates frequently argued for applying a lower standard of scrutiny
to racial classifications designed to promote equality.185 For feminists, strict
scrutiny was a mixed blessing: on the positive side, it might prevent courts
from taking at face value claims that “benign” sex classifications were motivated by a desire to ameliorate discrimination; on the negative side, it
could curtail efforts at “genuine” affirmative action. Thus when ERA proponents cited race cases as precedent for the ERA’s treatment of affirmative
action, they were in fact making something of a concession to opponents at
the same time that they were leaving the door open to proactive efforts at
achieving equality through sex classifications.
Amendment advocates turned to the race precedents almost automatically when Senator Hatch raised the affirmative action issue in the first
hearing on ERA II. In a memorandum to women’s organizations written
immediately after the first Senate hearing in May, Marsha Levick recorded
the feminist litigators’ responses to Hatch’s questions about the status of a
hypothetical ten percent set-aside for women in government contracting.
She wrote:
Presumably, such affirmative sex-conscious “remedies” would be no more or
less unconstitutional than the comparable race-conscious programs addressed
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke186 and Fullilove v. Klutznick:187 if an “institutionally competent actor” makes a finding of past discrimination vis-à-vis that institution, industry, etc., sex-conscious programs
could be implemented.188

The “etc.” in Levick’s sentence masked a key question: whether general,
society-wide discrimination was an adequate justification for sex-based affirmative action. The Court had suggested that it was in Califano v. Webster,189 but that same question was the subject of sometimes bitter struggle
184

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Indeed, as I explore elsewhere, some feminists argued in the late 1970s that sex equality precedents allowing legislatures to take societal discrimination into account when designing compensatory
policies for women provided a good template for race-based affirmative action jurisprudence. See Mayeri, supra note 172.
186
438 U.S. 265.
187
448 U.S. 448 (1980).
188
Memorandum from Marsha Levick to NOW-NOW LDEF ERA Legislative History Committee,
supra note 107, at 7 (footnotes added).
189
430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam) (noting that the purpose of the statute in question was
“redressing our society’s longstanding disparate treatment of women” (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199, 209 n.8 (1977)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
185
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in the context of race.190 When making the case to pro-ERA legislators,
ERA proponents framed congressional power to enact remedial legislation
in more expansive terms:
Where a qualified legislative or executive institution has found as a factual
predicate that a racial minority has suffered from past societal discrimination,
it may pass remedial legislation . . . . By equating a sexual classification with
a racial classification, the ERA would permit such legislation in favor of women.191

As the hearings progressed, it became clear that the analogy to racebased affirmative action was attractive in large part because it undermined
opponents’ charges that the ERA would mandate “equality of results” in all
circumstances. For instance, when opponents warned of the potential for
fifty percent quotas for women in the military, proponents could point to the
desegregation of the armed forces as belying this concern.192 Similarly, in
the Senate hearings on the ERA’s impact on the military, Hatch asked proERA witness Chayes whether the ERA would permit or require affirmative
action for women. She carefully replied that “where you are dealing with
affirmative action issues, where the policies are designed to correct inequities of the past, just as in race cases, they will be very carefully scrutinized
by the courts, if, indeed, they ever get to the courts.”193
In this sense, the race-based affirmative action precedents served as an
additional limiting principle to confine the reach of disparate impact analysis. As we saw earlier, proponents stressed that the application of disparate
190

See Mayeri, supra note 172 (describing feminists’ attempts during the 1970s to convince the
Court to apply the more lenient standard developed in sex equality cases to race-based affirmative action).
191
ERA Q’s and A’s (Kennedy) (on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, Box 23, Folder 30).
192
For example, when Delaware law professor Stanmeyer proclaimed that the ERA would require
fifty percent quotas for women in the military, including in combat roles, Columbia law professor Henry
Monaghan could allude to the desegregation of the armed forces to respond, “That’s plainly insupportable. . . . I mean, the race analogy is perfect . . . . There just is no basis for reading the Equal Rights
Amendment as imposing quotas on the military.” House Hearings, supra note 79, at 685 (statement of
Henry Paul Monaghan, Professor of Law, Columbia University).
193
Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 341–42 (testimony of Antonia Handler Chayes).
Hatch had asked Chayes about the ramifications of the ERA for a 1975 Court decision upholding a promotion scheme that allowed servicewomen additional time to achieve promotion before the military’s
up-or-out policy would apply. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S 498 (1975). After further back-andforth, she added, “I do not see any problem with affirmative action. We have dealt, I think, very nicely
with these problems in the title VII experience, and also under the equal protection clause.” Senate
Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 342. When Hatch pressed her further on whether the ERA would
mandate affirmative action for women in the service academies, Chayes again relied on the race cases,
saying, “I do not particularly see vastly greater numbers of women being admitted to service schools, as
compensation for past discrimination, particularly after the Bakke case . . . .” Id. at 352. Though she did
not elaborate, Chayes presumably was referring to Bakke’s failure to endorse a compensatory rationale
for affirmative action in the university context. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
306 n.34, 307–10 (1978).

1267

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

impact analysis to the Social Security system would not mandate any particular remedy, but rather would leave remediation to the discretion of Congress. Similarly, they emphasized that, in the words of Levick’s
memorandum, “[t]he Equal Rights Amendment must be seen for what it is:
A prohibition against how laws are made, or how they are implemented,
and not a guarantee of affirmative protection requiring particular action by
Congress or State legislatures.”194
Proponents also used an affirmative action rationale to limit the “absolute” nature of the prohibition on sex classifications in the context of singlesex education. They argued that while public single-sex schools and colleges would generally be unconstitutional under the ERA, there would be
an exception for all-female institutions designed to overcome the effects of
past discrimination and foster greater equality between women and men.
This position was the product of a compromise among feminists. Some
would have preferred to insert into the ERA’s legislative history an exception for single-sex colleges generally; others would have eschewed all exceptions to the coeducational rule.195 Conveniently, this compromise was
also the standard articulated in the 1982 Supreme Court decision in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,196 the first high-profile opinion authored by the first female Justice, Reagan-appointee Sandra Day O’Connor.
Hogan, as proponents often reminded their audience, had enshrined just the
distinction they wished to make: “Just as under present law, under the ERA
some schools or programs for women could continue affirmative admissions policies and compensatory aid for women if their single-sex nature is
evaluated as making a positive contribution to overcoming the effects of
discrimination and promoting sex equality.”197 Again, proponents relied on
equal protection jurisprudence to limit the ERA’s reach on one dimension,
even as they reached beyond the Fourteenth Amendment in defining the
ERA’s meaning on other dimensions.
As the head of a formerly all-female public women’s school, Hunter
College President Donna Shalala seemed the perfect witness to explain the
pro-ERA position on single-sex institutions. “The effect of the Equal
194

Memorandum from Marsha Levick to NOW-NOW LDEF ERA Legislative History Committee,
supra note 107, at 1. Opponents warned that these assurances were empty: Harvard government professor Eliot Cohen, for instance, predicted that even in the absence of a legal mandate for affirmative action, political pressure would force such policies on the government, including the military. Senate
Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 305 (statement of Eliot A. Cohen, Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University).
195
See, e.g., Memorandum from Marsha Levick to NOW-NOW LDEF ERA Legislative History
Committee, supra note 107, at 5 (noting in handwritten text: “Put into legis history ERA not intended to
affect single sex private schools.”).
196
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
197
Memorandum from Sally Burns, ERA Legislative History Project, to the Attorneys for the ERA
and Working Groups for the ERA, Re: Answers to Hatch Questions and Meeting with Hill Staff (July
19, 1983) (on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, Box 23, Folder 29) (citing Hogan as precedent).
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Rights Amendment on education is simple,” she wrote in her prepared testimony. “The choice of whether to discriminate on account of sex in education will no longer be an option. This means that unless educational
policies are justified by principles of affirmative action, schools must treat
males and females the same.”198 “Simplicity” notwithstanding, Shalala
found herself unexpectedly under attack from both sides. Senator Howard
Metzenbaum (D-OH), the only pro-ERA senator on hand that day, happened to enter the room while Shalala was explaining the affirmative action
exception to the ban on public single-sex colleges. As ERA Legislative
History Project coordinator Sally Burns described, “[w]ithout pausing,
Metzenbaum took issue with Shalala, stating that he would not favor an
ERA that permitted such a thing. He left without asking the helpful questions that he had come to pose.”199 Metzenbaum supported affirmative action generally, but objected to the exception as applied to women’s
colleges, and “he [was] not alone.”200 Meanwhile, Shalala was also under
fire from Hatch and from Jeremy Rabkin, a government professor from
Cornell. Rabkin challenged Shalala on the affirmative action exception as
well, noting the absence of such a qualification in the race context:
Neither the Department of Education, the Justice Department, nor any court, so
far as I am aware, has ever said, “If you want to be an all-black institution for
affirmative action reasons, that is all right, and you can exclude white applicants.” . . . Since racial segregation is not allowed even for affirmative action
reasons, I cannot understand what justification there could be for saying,
“Well, we will allow it in the case of sex discrimination, because some women
think it is good for them.” That seems to me to be trying to have your cake
and eat it too.201

In redefining the meaning of “equal rights under the law,” ERA proponents were engaged, simultaneously, in a number of delicate balancing acts.
For ERA II to be a worthwhile endeavor, the amendment had to move feminists beyond existing equal protection jurisprudence. By 1983, heightened scrutiny had vanquished many, though not all, explicit sex-based legal
distinctions, and the Court had established a very restrictive approach to
constitutional disparate impact cases. Without a robust interpretation of the
ERA’s applicability to sex-neutral laws, the amendment would not much
improve women’s legal status. Nevertheless, political realities dictated that
198

Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 129 (statement of Donna E. Shalala, President, Hunter
College of the City University of New York).
199
Memorandum from Sarah E. Burns to ERA Attorneys (Oct. 4, 1983) (on file with Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, Thomas Emerson Papers, Box 23, Folder 344).
200
Id. at 3. Burns continued, “The crisis has blown over and the coalition survives. A meeting with
Metzenbaum is planned this week. We may want to consider what acceptable qualifying detail should
be submitted with the Shalala testimony to address this point.” Id.
201
Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 135 (testimony of Jeremy A. Rabkin, Assistant Professor, Department of Government, and Director, Program on Courts and Public Policy, Cornell University).
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proponents must establish some limiting principles to check the reach of
disparate impact analysis. Feminists steadfastly resisted pro-ERA legislators’ attempts to endorse a “foreseeable consequences” test, but they did
find other ways to limit disparate impact analysis. They assured skeptics
that principles from equal protection and Title VII jurisprudence could prevent the ERA from overreaching, even if the need to depart from the DavisFeeney line of cases remained a central premise of the amendment’s definition of equality. As the next two sections describe, the ERA II hearings led
feminists to make similar compromises with respect to other aspects of the
amendment’s meaning.
C. “Too Much Baggage for the ERA to Carry”: Private Conduct
and the State Action Requirement
Like disparate impact and affirmative action, the ERA’s effect on private conduct was on proponents’ agenda as an issue for further research.
However, feminist lawyers disagreed on how expansively they should characterize the ERA’s reach into the “private conduct” of individuals and corporations. Some believed that proponents should minimize the extent to
which the ERA would directly or indirectly affect private conduct. They
argued for incorporating the Fourteenth Amendment’s state action requirement into the ERA and against expanding the amendment’s reach beyond
that authorized by the original legislative history of 1971 and 1972. This
more conservative approach bore a strong resemblance to proponents’ position on affirmative action, described in the preceding section, in that it relied on existing jurisprudence to delimit the ERA’s impact. Some
proponents even suggested incorporating into the ERA’s legislative history
an intent to exempt private single-sex schools from the ERA’s reach. Other
feminist lawyers took a more aggressive approach, arguing for an interpretation that would—like the disparate impact analysis described above—
extend the ERA’s reach beyond the strictures of existing state action doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment. As opponents charged that the
ERA would authorize or even mandate sweeping incursions into the private
sector, broadly defined, the amendment’s defenders ultimately settled upon
an intermediate strategy designed to deflect skeptics’ concerns while leaving open possibilities for more expansive interpretations.
As soon as the hearings began, ERA opponents, led by Senator Hatch,
focused upon the ERA’s impact on private educational and religious institutions as the principal example of the amendment’s incursions into the private sphere, with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bob Jones
University v. United States as the central cautionary tale. In Bob Jones, decided just three days before the first hearing on ERA II, the Court had upheld a decision by the Internal Revenue Service to revoke a tax exemption
to Bob Jones University, a conservative evangelical institution that prohib-
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ited interracial dating among students.202 Read expansively, Bob Jones did
not bode well for private single-sex schools or other entities that differentiated between males and females and relied on federal assistance, either in
the form of funding or exemption from taxation. Read narrowly, the decision provided several bases for limiting its impact on such institutions.
Many feminists’ initial inclination was not only to read Bob Jones expansively, but also to define the ERA as exerting significant impact on private conduct. At a May 1983 meeting immediately following the first
Senate hearing, proponents strategized about how to respond to Hatch’s
questions, which included queries about the effects of the ERA on private
and religious schools and other entities. The feminist lawyers concluded
that “after Bob Jones, it seems that [private single-sex schools] must begin
to accept the limits of their continued existence as single-sex schools.”203
Long-time women’s rights advocate and ERA activist Catherine East dissented from this view, suggesting that proponents put in the legislative history a clear indication that the ERA was not intended to apply to private
single-sex schools.204 Advocates for a more expansive ERA interpretation
continued to flesh out their view; in a July 1983 memo, ERA Legislative
History Project coordinator Sally Burns recorded their assertion that
[t]he reach of the ERA with respect to private education would depend on the
extent of state involvement. A private institution whose sex segregation policies could not be justified on the grounds of affirmative action might lose government funds. Similarly, a private tax-exempt institution could lose its tax
exemption . . . if its policies of sex discrimination were found to offend public
policy.205

This reference to public policy was a partial concession to the limits of the
Bob Jones decision, which was predicated upon the unanimous consensus
among the three branches of government regarding the abhorrent nature of
race discrimination. However, it emphasized the possibilities of using Bob
Jones as a precedent for expansive interpretations of the ERA, rather than
stressing the decision’s limitations.
The debate among feminist lawyers over the ERA’s scope continued
over the next several months. East described the contending positions in an
internal memo in October 1983: “The feminist legal community is attempting to secure legislative history that would require withdrawal of tax exemption not only from private schools but from other single-sex private
organizations unless ‘sex segregation is one part of a plan of affirmative ac202

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580–85 (1983).
Memorandum from Marsha Levick to NOW-NOW LDEF ERA Legislative History Committee,
supra note 107, at 5.
204
Id. at 5 (urging in handwritten notes that the ERA is “not intended to affect single sex private
schools”).
205
Memorandum from Sally Burns, ERA Legislative History Project, to the Attorneys for the ERA
and Working Groups for the ERA, supra note 197.
203
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tion to overcome the past effects of discrimination’ against women.”206 This
approach, she noted, had the support of NOW leaders Eleanor Smeal and
Judy Goldsmith. “My view,” wrote East, “is that this is too much baggage
for the ERA to carry . . . . I would like to see the legislative history clearly
indicate that the ERA would apply only where ‘State action’ as defined in
Supreme Court decisions is involved.”207 In suggesting this alternative
strategy, East harkened back to the first ERA debates of the early 1970s:
“The original ERA was not intended to apply to private schools, girl scouts,
boy scouts, women’s hospitals, or women’s organizations, even if they received some government funding.”208 To ask for more seemed to East strategically unwise, although she expressed wholehearted agreement with her
colleagues’ substantive goals.
Meanwhile, ERA opponents seized on Bob Jones to highlight the
amendment’s potential to disrupt not only the educational autonomy of private schools, but also the integrity of churches, seminaries, and other religious institutions. The testimony of Cornell professor Rabkin was perhaps
the most damning from the point of view of ERA skeptics: Rabkin contended that the ERA would prohibit direct federal or state funding of singlesex institutions, any federal and state subsidization of equipment for schools
that differentiated between the sexes, and all tax exemptions for private institutions that treated men and women differently.209 Each of these outcomes, Rabkin argued, followed logically from the ERA’s
constitutionalization of an equivalence between race and sex discrimination.
This equivalence, Rabkin submitted, was fundamentally misguided:
Now we have done all this to private schools that persist in racial discrimination precisely to express an unyielding abhorrence to racist practices. The
question again is whether we want to oppose all aspects of sexual separation or
differentiation with equally uncompromising condemnation, imposing the
same financial penalties and the same moral stigma. My own view is that
there is something terribly wrong with a constitution that puts the sexual exclusion of a Catholic seminary or a traditional women’s college on the same
plane with the racial bigotry of a white supremacist ‘segregation academy’.210

Rabkin’s implicit acceptance of the Bob Jones decision as correct rendered
more credible his objections to extending the principle to cover sex discrimination.

206

Memorandum from Catherine East, ERA—Major Issues 3–4 (Oct. 11, 1983) (on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, Box 23, Folder 47).
207
Id. at 4.
208
Id. at 3.
209
Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 99–100 (statement of Jeremy A. Rabkin, Assistant
Professor, Department of Government, and Director, Program on Courts and Public Policy, Cornell
University).
210
Id. at 110.
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Rabkin’s testimony prompted ERA proponents to refine their position
on private organizations and the relationship of the amendment to private
conduct generally. In a memorandum circulated to proponents a few weeks
after Rabkin’s appearance before the Senate subcommittee, Sally Burns
wrote to her compatriots of the need for clarification: “Rabkin drew a picture of sweeping state intervention into the private sphere and it was difficult to make a clear counter-record on his parade of horribles in oral
testimony.”211 Burns’s memo suggested a subtle shift in the feminist lawyers’ approach: now the task was “to have scholarly legal materials on the
state action and tax exempt status issues on the record to demonstrate just
how unlikely based on past court decisions Rabkin’s predicted sweep is.”212
The perceived need to limit the ERA’s reach into the private sphere was
driven home by Hatch’s summary of Donna Shalala’s testimony in the same
hearing, which starkly portrayed her position as unremittingly hostile to sex
differentiation in private as well as public education except where such differentiation furthered affirmative action goals.213
In an attempt at damage control, Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ),
an ERA supporter, submitted questions to Shalala after the hearing that
would enable proponents to clarify the ERA’s relationship to private conduct and existing state action doctrine. Consultation with feminist lawyers
Wendy Webster Williams and Ann Freedman produced a written statement
from Shalala that “absent additional legislative or executive action, private
institutions will rarely be subject to the requirements of the ERA just as private institutions are now rarely subject to the 14th Amendment requirements.”214 As in the affirmative action context, existing Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence provided the limiting principle. Further, on occasion proponents emphasized that state action doctrine had evolved since
the early 1970s to make private entities much less susceptible to lawsuits
charging equal protection or other constitutional violations than they had
been a decade earlier.215
The feminist lawyers also offered a much narrower reading of Bob
Jones than they had previously contemplated: they emphasized that Bob
211

Memorandum from Sarah E. Burns to ERA Attorneys, supra note 199, at 3.
Id.
213
Impact of the ERA Upon Private and Parochial Education (circulated by Sen. Hatch) (Oct. 1983)
(on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, Box
23, Folder 31) (“Private Schools—The ERA required the integration of all single-sex private schools
and colleges receiving any form of direct or indirect public funds, including tax exemptions, except for
those all-women institutions based upon principles of ‘affirmative action.’ (Shalala: ‘I do not know of
any institution in the country in which there is not public involvement.’)”).
214
Senate Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 169 (statement of Donna E. Shalala, President, Hunter
College of the City University of New York, in response to questions of Senator Dennis DeConcini).
215
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505 & n.10 (1985)
(“There is no doubt that the Burger Court has tightened substantially the state action requirement, showing far less willingness to apply the Constitution’s protections against private conduct.”).
212

1273

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Jones was based on statutory rather than constitutional authority, and that
the decision permitted, but did not require, the IRS to withhold tax-exempt
status from racially discriminatory private organizations. ERA proponents
assured the subcommittees that Congress retained full discretion to grant
tax exemptions to private organizations; failure to grant such exemptions
could only occur if a robust public policy against sexual differentiation
comparable to that against race discrimination were established. In other
words, sex-differentiating private entities could rest assured that the ERA
would not affect their tax status unless a societal consensus developed that
their policies were as abhorrent as racial discrimination. Because opponents were fond of emphasizing that no such consensus yet existed, the
danger of sex-differentiating institutions becoming “embittered,” “isolated,”
or downright bankrupt as a result of the withdrawal of tax-exempt status
was minimal. Proponents also contended that the First Amendment would
protect purely religious activities from the ERA’s reach under any circumstances, although the line between religious and secular activities remained
notoriously difficult to draw.
In the end, proponents’ position on the ERA’s impact on private entities and its relationship to existing state action doctrine occupied a middle
ground between the cautious approach advised by East and the more expansive interpretation advanced by other feminist lawyers. Proponents’ treatment of what was perhaps the most politically hazardous topic of the ERA
II hearings, abortion, was also the product of an uneasy compromise among
feminist lawyers and other ERA proponents.
D. “An Untenable Position”: Abortion, Pregnancy, and the
New ERA
The “abortion-ERA connection” had been a centerpiece of Phyllis
Schlafly’s STOP ERA campaign. Opponents’ unremitting efforts to derail
the amendment on this basis drove many proponents to elide or even deny
the connection despite their firm conviction that reproductive freedom and
sex equality were inextricably intertwined.216 During the ERA’s pendency,
proponents engaged in a behind-the-scenes campaign of their own to keep
feminist litigators from raising sex-based equal protection arguments
against abortion restrictions in cases brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.217 The lawyers who argued Harris v. McRae,218 the 1980 federal abor216

MANSBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 124–25; Siegel, supra note 8, at 1397 (“As countermobilization
against ERA and Roe converged, leadership of the women’s movement struggled to defend ERA and
Roe by separating them, over time engaging in ever more strenuous efforts of self-censorship.”).
217
MANSBRIDGE, supra note 7 at 125; see also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 985–87 (1984).
218
448 U.S. 297 (1980). For an overview of equality-based arguments for abortion rights, see Reva
B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007). Siegel notes, “Appeals to sex equality as a legal basis for
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tion funding case, refrained from making a sex-based equal protection argument, believing that Geduldig left them little chance of success.219 But
even before, and especially after, the Court upheld the Hyde Amendment,220
litigators at the state level could not justify withholding one of their best potential weapons against abortion funding restrictions—state ERAs.221 As
the prospect for the ERA’s ratification grew increasingly dim, maintaining a
strict ERA-abortion separation no longer seemed to be worth pragmatism’s
price.222
When the ERA was reintroduced in 1983, proponents faced a potentially fateful choice: they could continue to deny that the ERA would have
any impact on abortion rights, or they could acknowledge the relationship
between abortion and sex equality as a constitutional as well as a political
and moral reality. As the hearings and feminists’ internal deliberations
went on, it became clear that neither of these dichotomous alternatives was
politically viable. To be candid about feminists’ hopes for the ERA and
abortion rights would augur certain doom. On the other hand, the way in
which proponents denied or downplayed the “ERA-abortion connection”223—the reasoning they used, the doctrinal arguments upon which they
relied—had significant ramifications not only for the abortion issue, but for
other crucial aspects of the ERA’s new constitutional meaning and for future battles over women’s legal status.
Given the abortion issue’s prominence in the ratification struggle, feminists were well aware that the hearings on ERA II would be a test of their
ability to strike the right balance between candor and circumspection, boldness and caution. Exactly what that balance should be was a matter of considerable dispute, however. Feminists had disagreed over how best to
handle the relationship between the ERA and reproductive rights in the decthe abortion right disappeared [in the years following Roe] for both doctrinal and political reasons.” Id.
at 826.
219
Rhonda Copelon & Sylvia A. Law, Medicaid Funding for Abortion: The Story of Harris v.
McRae [working title], in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M.
Wildman eds., forthcoming 2010). Mansbridge reports, based on a 1985 interview with Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, that “[t]he eventual ACLU decision to stress autonomous decisionmaking free from state intervention rather than sex discrimination in the federal abortion funding case was . . . made on the basis
of ‘what argument was most likely to win . . . . The ERA was not a consideration in how that case was
argued—not at all.’” MANSBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 287 n.4.
220
The Hyde Amendment, first passed in 1976, barred the use of federal funds to pay for abortion
services for low-income women. Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976).
221
MANSBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 126, 287 n.7 (citing From the Executive Director’s Desk,
DOCKET (newsletter of the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts), Aug. 1980, reprinted in Senate
Hearings, Part I, supra note 83, at 657 (submitted for the record)).
222
Siegel, supra note 8, at 1399–1400.
223
Opponents popularized the term “ERA-abortion connection” during the ratification debates of
the 1970s, and continued to use it in reference to ERA II. See, e.g., The E.R.A.-Abortion Connection,
PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY REP., June 1983, § 2, at 1 (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute,
Harvard University).
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ade since Roe v. Wade catapulted the issue onto a national stage, but by and
large they suppressed their differences to preserve a unified front. Now the
reintroduction of the amendment offered a second bite at the apple. Attorney Rhonda Copelon, who had argued the abortion funding case Harris v.
McRae before the Supreme Court, expressed the views of many feminists in
a Ms. Magazine article in October 1983: “The separation of abortion from
the campaign for the ERA has jeopardized abortion and produced a truncated version of liberation.”224 Feminists should embrace the ERA-abortion
connection, Copelon suggested—if not with pride, then at least with grim
determination. Copelon’s analysis—frequently referenced by ERA opponents as evidence of feminists’ true intentions for the ERA—eschewed
sharp boundaries between privacy and equality.225
As ERA proponents prepared for the hearings in the spring of 1983,
they considered a range of approaches to the abortion question. A memo
circulated by Marsha Levick to the ERA Legislative History Committee
members in April laid out three alternative responses to the question, “Is a
woman’s right to voluntarily choose to undergo an abortion enhanced, sustained or diminished by a federal equal rights amendment?”226 As the boldest option, Levick articulated a vision of the abortion right “as an aspect of
the right shared by men and women equally to control their reproductive
capacity, and to retain for themselves the right to decide when and under
what circumstances they wish to become a parent.”227 This vision of equality unashamedly linked abortion with both equal rights and privacy, and
conceptualized reproductive freedom as a good that should be available to
both men and women, rather than characterizing pregnancy as a “unique
physical characteristic” subject to a different mode of analysis.
The two other responses Levick outlined sacrificed this expansiveness
at the altar of pragmatism. One possibility was to say that the abortion right
“is unaffected. A woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy by
abortion is a fundamental right which derives from her general right to privacy granted by the Constitution . . . articulated and recognized by Roe v.
Wade,” so strict scrutiny should continue to apply to “all laws and regulations impacting on a woman’s right to undergo an abortion.”228 The final alternative was to treat abortion regulations as laws concerning “unique
224
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physical characteristics,” subject to strict scrutiny under the ERA.229 On
this view, discrimination against women on the basis of their ability to become pregnant clearly constituted sex discrimination, repudiating the Supreme Court’s contrary decision in Geduldig v. Aiello.230 Levick recognized
the need “to make the scope of [the ERA’s] coverage of [pregnancy-based
discrimination] clear through legislative history,” because Geduldig had severed the link between pregnancy and sex discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.231
But, as Levick also recognized, it was difficult if not impossible to deny a connection between the ERA and abortion while maintaining that the
amendment addressed discrimination based on pregnancy. As Levick put
it, “If pregnancy-based discrimination is sex discrimination, it is difficult to
substantiate the position that disparate or discriminatory treatment of women wishing to undergo abortion is not sex discrimination since abortion, like
pregnancy, can only be experienced by women, and is clearly ‘pregnancyrelated.’”232 Not only would such a position produce logical dissonance,
but, Levick argued, it would also compromise an important feminist principle: “To accept that abortion is unlike pregnancy would seem to suggest an
acceptance of the right to life position, i.e., abortion is different because it
involves another life (fetus) and other interests (spouse/father). This seems
to be an untenable position for the women’s movement to endorse, and a
major step backwards.”233 The challenge for feminists was to find a way
“[t]o ensure that pregnancy is subsumed in the definition of sex discrimination at the same time that we strive to maintain a low profile on abortion.”234
In order to accomplish these objectives simultaneously, Levick wrote, “a
combination of responses #1 and #2 would have to be put forward.”235
Easier said than done. As Levick’s memo suggested, feminists’ new
definition of the ERA’s legal meaning put the pro-choice ERA advocates
between a rock (pregnancy discrimination) and a hard place (disparate impact analysis). Denying the ERA’s impact on abortion rights risked excising pregnancy discrimination from the amendment’s definition of equality:
if the ERA required strict scrutiny for laws relating to women’s unique
physical characteristics (UPC), then it was difficult to see how the UPC category could include pregnancy but exclude abortion. At the same time, applying disparate impact analysis to laws regulating abortion produced a
clear logical result—irrespective of one’s views on the morality of terminating a pregnancy, no one could dispute that restricting abortion, or funding
229
230
231
232
233
234
235

Id. at 1–2.
417 U.S. 484 (1974).
Levick, supra note 226, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1277

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

for abortion, had a disproportionate effect on women.236 Further, whichever
box abortion was in—UPC or disparate impact—strict scrutiny would apply. If the ERA was meant to elevate the level of scrutiny for sex discrimination to the same level as, if not a higher level than, that accorded to race
discrimination, it was difficult to see how any restrictions on abortion
would be valid under the ERA unless they served a compelling government
interest. And pro-choice advocates certainly were loath to concede that the
protection of fetal life constituted such a compelling interest.
Abortion had played only a minor role in the pre-Roe discussion of the
ERA; during the ratification debates the discourse about the relationship between abortion and the ERA was largely heated rhetoric rather than intricate
doctrinal parsing. But in the hearings on ERA II, proponents could not
evade pointed legal questions from a well-prepared and often sophisticated
opposition. In the first Senate hearing, pro-ERA witnesses attempted to
skirt these questions. Tsongas responded to Hatch’s questions about the
amendment’s impact on abortion funding with his standard response that
the issue would be decided by the courts.237 Marna Tucker demurred, saying she did not know enough about the issue to answer.238 Then Hatch
called on Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), author of the law prohibiting
Medicaid funding for abortions, to testify about the ERA’s impact on the
Hyde Amendment’s constitutionality. Hyde invoked an analogy that antiERA witnesses and legislators would repeat again and again through the
hearings: “If sex discrimination were treated like race discrimination, Government refusal to fund abortions would be treated like a refusal to fund
medical procedures that affect members of minority races.”239 Opponents’
favorite example was sickle-cell anemia. As Grover Rees argued in the first
House hearing, “[A] legislative program that funds other operations’ but not
abortion would be constitutionally identical to a program that funded cures
for every disease except sickle-cell anemia, to which only blacks are susceptible.”240 Representative DeWine proceeded to ask nearly every witness
who came before the House about the validity of the sickle-cell anemia
analogy, which proved difficult to refute. Washington University professor
Jules Gerard stated it in a later hearing,
I find it remarkable, since [proponents] talk[] about the potential of ERA to
overturn statutes which have a disparate impact on women, for them to conclude that the classical statute which must have a disparate impact on women
236
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. . . would be unaffected. All of a sudden, disparate impact is some irrelevant
consideration. I don’t understand their logic.241

By the second House hearing, it had become clear that witnesses were
susceptible to abortion-related questions regardless of their area of expertise. Feminist attorneys carefully briefed the pro-ERA witnesses on how to
respond to these questions. The strategy, in essence, was to state that abortion rights were protected by privacy jurisprudence under the Fourteenth
Amendment, implying that the ERA was redundant rather than revolutionary while leaving the door open to a legislative history free of unequivocal
statements about the ERA’s irrelevance to reproductive rights. Striking this
delicate balance—difficult even in theory—proved very nearly impossible
in the hearing room. When DeWine asked the witnesses about the ERA’s
impact on the Hyde Amendment, long-time women’s rights advocate Bernice Sandler deftly replied that while she was not a legal expert, she wanted
to “reiterate . . . that the Supreme Court has not viewed abortion under the
Equal Protection Clause as a civil rights issue. They have always viewed it
in terms of due process and privacy, and that is where the Court has been
coming from all along.”242 So far, so good, but DeWine pressed further—
“Is [the] panel’s opinion . . . that the passage of the ERA would not in any
way affect the right to an abortion or any legislation that might follow?”—
prompting Tish Sommers of the Older Women’s League and Diana Pearce
of Catholic University’s Center for National Policy Review to declare, that
the ERA would have “no relationship” to abortion.243
The feminist lawyers responsible for coordinating proponents’ testimony were dismayed. Burns wrote to her colleagues in early October, “All
the September 14 House witnesses were briefed on the abortion answer.
Still some went too far and said ‘no relation,’” an understanding subsequently memorialized by House counsel in a summary interpretation to be
used by members of Congress in their own testimony.244 “Obviously,”
Burns wrote, “legislative history to that effect is troubling to pro-choice
concerns.”245 Meanwhile, congressional proponents of the amendment
regularly labeled the issue a “red herring.” They had a point—as Senator
Packwood told Hatch, “[M]y hunch would be if you put the strongest antiabortion rider on this amendment that you could dream up, it would not
change a single antiabortion vote toward the amendment.”246 But remarks
like Representative Charles Schumer’s (D-NY) compounded the problem:
241
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[A]bortion has nothing to do with discrimination between men and women, period, until the time when a man can have an abortion or become pregnant, and
then maybe it will have something to do with it. But until that point we ought
to just abandon that argument and throw it out. . . . It is just ridiculous, I have
to say that.247

Moreover, proponents continued to argue about how to respond to
questions about public funding for abortion. Catherine East recorded in October that Rutgers law professor Ann Freedman “believe[d] the ratification
of the ERA [would] not affect Supreme Court decisions on Medicaid funding,” while others, including Marcia Greenberger and Judy Lichtman
“[thought] that it [would] (or hope[d] that it [would]) if we don’t have in the
legislative history any statement that it won’t have any effect or that ERA
had ‘no relation’ to abortion.”248 Greenberger and Lichtman counseled
Freedman “to ‘stonewall’ if Congressman DeWine presse[d] her with questions and not to state her legal reasoning for thinking it [would] have no
impact.”249 East agreed with Freedman, and suggested that in order to ward
off the inclusion of an antiabortion rider to the ERA, proponents offer “a
clear unequivocal statement in the House Committee report that it is not the
intent of the Congress that the ERA have any impact on abortion.”250 In the
final House hearing on ERA II, Freedman and Emerson reiterated the argument that courts would continue to decide abortion cases under the right
to privacy, regardless of the ERA’s fate. While feminist lawyers were scrupulously careful not to disavow all connection between the new ERA and
abortion, their strategy of circumvention fell far short of many feminists’
aspirations for the ERA.
E. The Dual Strategy Revisited
As ERA I’s official expiration date neared, Senator Slade Gorton, a
moderate Republican from Washington State, conferred with the eminent
constitutional scholar Gerald Gunther about an alternative strategy for
achieving “equality of rights under the law.” Why not legislate the substance of the ERA with a bill designed to achieve the amendment’s aims
without submitting to Article V’s requirement of state approval, Gorton
wondered? Gunther’s reaction was positive. “I continue to believe that this
is a notion worth pursuing,” the Stanford law professor wrote to Gorton in a
letter dated July 1, 1982, the day after the ratification deadline.251 He noted
247
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that such a bill would expand the definition of equality beyond that authorized by the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, but concluded, “[S]urely
you have a sufficiently substantial legal ground to warrant going ahead with
a clear constitutional conscience. The politics of it . . . may be another matter, but you are a far better judge of that than I.”252
Just as they had spurned well-meaning attempts to substitute a “women’s equal protection clause” for an ERA a dozen years earlier,253 women’s
organizations rejected Gorton’s proposed “Equal Rights Bill.” They understood the bill to be “a well-intentioned effort.”254 However, after inviting
feedback from dozens of groups and individuals concerned with women’s
rights, the coalition’s response was decidedly negative. Feminists had
many quibbles with the details of the particular bill Gorton drafted, but
most of their objections would have applied to virtually any piece of legislation designed to accomplish the ERA’s goals without amending the Constitution. The Gorton bill essentially proposed to extend the Equal
Protection Clause’s most robust protections, formerly accorded only against
racial discrimination, to women. According to a NOW LDEF memo summarizing the reactions of feminist advocates to the proposal, this approach
had several fatal flaws. First, critics noted the obvious fact that as a statute,
the provision would be “vulnerable to amendment or repeal.”255 Second,
feminists worried that the Court would not sustain such legislation as a valid exercise of Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment because opponents could persuasively “claim that Congress is
seeking to invalidate laws that the Supreme Court, left to its own devices,
would uphold.”256 Third, the advocates worried that any bill seeking to alter
judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause would lend legitimacy
to the “Human Life bill,” an attempt by antiabortion lawmakers to change
the definition of “persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment.257
Finally, and perhaps most fatally, the Gorton bill risked perpetuating
the very flaws in equal protection jurisprudence that the ERA was meant to
transcend. As the memo put it, “The Equal Protection Clause itself carries
some very unfortunate baggage,” including the requirement that “men and
women must be similarly situated in order for discrimination to exist,” and
the fact that “proof of intent has been required even in ‘disparate impact’
cases.”258 Further, there was “no guarantee that even a command that courts
employ ‘strict scrutiny’ will overcome the tendency, particularly of the Su252

Id.
I discuss these efforts in detail in Mayeri, supra note 16.
254
Memorandum from Phyllis Segal & Anne Simon to Feminist Attorneys (July 22, 1982) (on file
with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, NOW Papers, Box 191, Folder 9).
255
Id. at 1.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Id. at 2.
253

1281

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

preme Court, to take a narrow view of ‘equal protection’ for women.”259
These shortcomings made feminists determined to pursue their goals
through constitutional amendment rather than legislation, despite their
poignant recognition that passage and ratification was likely to take “another ten years.”260
Gorton’s aides tried to assure the women’s coalition that the equal
rights bill was designed to “complement a renewed [ERA] ratification effort, not to supplant it.”261 But just as many feminists had been wary of distracting state ERA campaigns in the final years of ERA I’s ratification
battle, they knew they lacked the resources and political capital to fight on
multiple fronts in Congress. The coalition decided to oppose the Gorton
bill and “put[] all our energies into the Equal Rights Amendment.”262 This
decision hardly put to rest the dilemmas associated with pursuing legal and
constitutional change through multiple avenues.
As I have explored elsewhere, in the 1960s, legal feminists surmounted
internal divisions within the women’s movement to coalesce around a “dual
strategy” for constitutional change.263 After decades of division over the
strategy and substance of achieving constitutional equality for women, legal
feminists—led by pragmatic strategists like Pauli Murray and Mary Eastwood—determined to pursue litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment
and advocate for an ERA simultaneously. The dual strategy enabled feminists to transcend their longstanding differences over the proper constitutional home for women’s rights, and allowed them to pursue their goals on
multiple fronts. But as the ERA ratification debate dragged on for over a
decade, the logistical complexities of the dual strategy mounted. Successfully arguing that the Equal Protection Clause guaranteed the very rights
feminists sought from an ERA undermined the need for a new amendment,
while continuing to press for a new amendment implied that the Fourteenth
Amendment was wanting even as litigators argued the opposite in court.
The dilemmas of the dual strategy did not disappear when the states
failed to ratify the ERA, but they transmogrified. By 1982, the Court had
resolved, for better or for worse, many of the equal protection questions that
feminists had litigated during the 1970s—the status of laws that assumed
women’s economic dependency, pregnancy discrimination, disparate im-
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pact, the military draft. Cases like Geduldig,264 Feeney,265 and Rostker266 had
defined the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment, closing off possibilities
that had remained open in the early 1970s. On the other hand, the ReedFrontiero line of cases had established that many laws that classified men
and women on the basis of sex would be subjected to heightened scrutiny,
and often struck down as perpetuating stereotypical sex roles.267 When the
ERA was reintroduced in 1983, feminists had the luxury of knowing how
the contours of equal protection jurisprudence had developed, an advantage
they lacked in 1972. In areas where equal protection had fallen short—
pregnancy discrimination, disparate impact, and military equality among
them—feminists did not have to worry as much about how their arguments
about the ERA would affect their fortunes in Fourteenth Amendment litigation. Nor, by definition, did they have to fear that progress achieved under
the Fourteenth Amendment would undermine their arguments for an ERA.
Some of the old dilemmas of the dual strategy remained, however.
Since long before congressional passage of the original ERA, opponents of
the amendment—who once upon a time had included many women’s rights
advocates—had argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause could provide the salutary aspects of an ERA without its alleged rigidity. In the debates over ERA II, opponents continued to press this line of
argument, with a great deal of additional ammunition. Since the Court’s
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence had evolved, opponents contended
that the only further changes an ERA would bring were, at best, contrary to
public opinion, and at worst, disastrous. Anti-ERA witness Grover Rees,
for instance, emphasized that any legislative revisions that the amendment
would require or inspire were “superfluous, because that can be done under
the equal protection clause.”268
264
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Changes brought about under Title VII further fortified this argument.
However, ERA proponents emphasized the continuing disparities between
women’s and men’s earnings to justify the ongoing need for an ERA. But,
the problem with proponents’ reasoning was that it was difficult to see how
an ERA would affect wage inequality in light of existing laws mandating
equal pay for equal work.269 As they had been during the ratification campaign, ERA opponents were quick to counter assertions that the amendment
would narrow the wage gap by pointing out that unlike Title VII, the ERA
would not cover private employers. Rees declared in the first House hearing on ERA II that while proponents often emphasized that the ERA would
affect state action only, “we hear that the equal rights amendment is going
to solve . . . the 59-cents-on-the-dollar-problem. You cannot have it both
ways. Overwhelmingly, the discriminating employers are private employers.”270 Some took the argument a step further, suggesting that if existing
antidiscrimination laws had not successfully eliminated the wage gap, then
differences between men’s and women’s incomes must be attributable to
factors other than discrimination. Statistician Carl Hoffman noted that
advocates of the ERA state specifically that an amendment is required in order
for women to achieve the same changes as blacks have achieved . . . . The results of much of my work argue rather that the mechanisms causing the differences in income between men and women are of a different type than those
that caused the differences between blacks and whites.271

For instance, “women have been less aggressive in seeking promotions and
this is true even in companies that have encouraged them equally,” and
women were disproportionately burdened by their family responsibilities, a
disparity that the ERA would not touch.272
While feminist advocates like Donna Shalala and Bernice Sandler argued that the ERA was necessary to “eliminate the gaps in coverage under
existing laws,”273 opponents responded that these “gaps” were not the unfortunate result of shortsighted policymaking, but rather of purposeful, sensible line-drawing by judges and legislators. As Professor Rabkin put it,
referring to the differences between Title IX’s coverage and the ERA’s
mandate, “These are not gaps. They were deliberate decisions to set up the
law one way, rather than another way. They are an expression of legislative
judgment; they are an expression of concern to be flexible and to be reason-
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able . . . .”274 Others suggested that the ERA’s other effects imposed too
high a price to pay for the amendment’s limited effects on women’s economic equality. Schlafly made this point in particularly colorful terms. She
argued that, given the changes precipitated by Title VII, Title IX, and the
Equal Protection Clause, the ERA’s sole effect on women’s employment
opportunities would be to eliminate the bona fide occupational qualification
exception for public jobs. Schlafly declared:
For this, we are asked to constitutionalize taxpayer-funding of abortions and
homosexual marriages, allow our daughters to be drafted and sent into combat
just like our sons, forfeit veterans’ preference and tax exemption of religious
schools, sacrifice traditional rights of wives, abandon our right to have singlesex schools and extra-curricular activities, pay greatly increased insurance
premiums, and transfer enormous new powers from the states to the federal
courts.275

Neither had the old dilemma that arguing for a new amendment had the
potential to undermine favorable judicial interpretations of existing provisions disappeared. For instance, proponents’ assertion that the ERA would
provide a firmer basis for congressional legislation designed to prevent or
ameliorate sex discrimination risked suggesting that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not already authorize such action. But what produced the most troublesome tension between ERA advocacy and other
constitutional and statutory provisions were the arguments feminist litigators had advanced under the Equal Protection Clause, Title VII, and the
state ERAs with respect to pregnancy discrimination and abortion funding.
Feminist lawyers had vigorously pursued an expansive definition of sex
discrimination in earlier pregnancy discrimination cases, a definition they
now hoped to incorporate into the new ERA. Opponents regularly noted
that laws concerning pregnancy—a “unique physical characteristic” just
like abortion—very much came within the ambit of sex equality, according
to the same ERA proponents who now sought to dissociate the amendment
from abortion. Moreover, they regularly emphasized that pro-choice advocates had cited state ERAs to support their contention that state constitutions required public funding of abortions. Opponents’ favorite smoking
gun was a 1980 newsletter item from the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts:
The state Equal Rights Amendment provides a legal argument that was unavailable to us or anyone at the federal level. . . . Because a strong coalition is
being forged between the anti-ERA coalition and the anti-abortion people, it
was our hope to be able to save Medicaid payments for medically necessary
abortions through the federal court route without having to use the state Equal
274
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Rights Amendment and possibly fuel the national anti-ERA movement. But
the loss in [Harris v. McRae] was the last straw. We now have no recourse but
to turn to the State Constitution for the legal hook to save Medicaid funding
for abortions.276

Pro-choice advocates in Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and other states had made
similar calculations. ERA skeptics not unreasonably wondered why, if feminists argued that the sex equality guaranteed by state ERA encompassed
government funding for abortion, the federal ERA would not be impressed
into the service of the pro-choice cause.
Proponents’ attempts to distance themselves from pro-abortion funding
arguments made under state ERAs were also in some tension with their position on gay rights. Whereas feminists hoped to draw attention away from
the state ERA experience when it came to abortion, the Washington ERA
case Singer v. Hara277 served as the centerpiece of proponents’ case for the
federal ERA’s inapplicability to matters of sexual preference. Proponents
regularly cited Singer as proof that the federal ERA would not mandate
same-sex marriage or other rights for homosexuals.278
At the same time, feminists did not necessarily want the emerging jurisprudence under state ERAs wholly to define the federal ERA’s meaning.
State ERAs had produced a variety of results, and not all of them had fulfilled feminist hopes. Nor did feminists wish to leave the impression that
state ERAs were sufficient replacements for a federal amendment. Feminist
leaders also worried that campaigns for new state ERAs would divert energy and resources away from the federal ERA campaign. After considerable friction with state organizations, leading national women’s groups had
called for a moratorium on advocacy for new state constitutional amendments in 1980.279
Pursuing legal change on multiple fronts continued to complicate feminists’ constitutional amendment advocacy. The old dilemmas of the dual
strategy were in some ways muted by caselaw development under the Fourteenth Amendment and by the opportunity, now that the first ERA had gone
down to defeat, to redefine the amendment and distinguish its meaning
from existing sex equality jurisprudence. But if the old dual strategy di276
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lemmas had largely, though not completely, receded into the background,
new strategic puzzles had emerged. Most prominently, attempts to pin reproductive rights to sex equality under state ERAs, the federal Constitution,
and statutory provisions, undermined federal ERA proponents’ efforts to
deflect attention from the “abortion-ERA connection.” Feminists, already
profoundly ambivalent about the strategic separation of reproductive rights
from the ERA, found themselves compelled to compromise once again.
III. THE LEGACIES OF ERA II
In the end, proponents’ strategic compromises proved insufficient to
save ERA II. Despite the best efforts of feminists and their congressional
allies, ERA II’s potency as a political weapon ultimately proved of limited
utility. Nevertheless, the debate over ERA II was of lasting significance to
the history of legal feminism. The hearings pushed proponents to hone new
doctrinal proposals that balanced feminists’ aspirations with concerns about
judicial manageability and practicality. They also drove home the limitations of constitutional amendment advocacy as a means to the ends legal
feminists sought. And for scholars, the debates over ERA II provide an invaluable picture of how the legal and political landscape changed and failed
to change over one of the most transformative decades in women’s legal
history.
A. “We Have to Have a Vote, Win or Lose”: ERA II’s Career
as a Political Weapon
NOW and NWPC officials and House leaders agreed in November
1983 that supporters would bring the ERA to a floor vote with a closed rule
that would prohibit amendments, forcing members to vote yes or no. “We
have to have a vote, win or lose,” declared Judy Goldsmith, as feminists
promised to campaign against ERA opponents in the 1984 elections.280 An
L.A. Times editorial warned that “a failure to stand up for equality this time
could affect political careers more than standing up for it did in 1972.
Women are far more politically active now than they were then.”281 As
Mary Frances Berry recounts, feminist strategists believed the ERA had a
chance of passing the House, in which case they could concentrate on winning Senate support.282 If the amendment failed to pass, or passed the Senate with crippling exemptions, they could make conservative opposition a
campaign issue.283
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Forcing the vote and stifling attempts to amend infuriated many Republicans, with Representative Larry Craig (R-ID) chastising Speaker
O’Neill, “Shame on you, Mr. Speaker, shame on you.”284 House Minority
Leader Robert Michel (R-IL) complained, “The majority is engaging in an
abuse of power that would bring a blush to the cheeks of the most absolute
despot of antiquity.”285 The ERA fell six votes short of the two-thirds majority needed for passage, 278-147.286 Representative Hamilton Fish (RNY), a cosponsor of the ERA, said that Democrats’ procedural move was
nothing more than “partisan politics in search of a campaign issue.”287 But
Republican feminist Kathy Wilson, chair of the National Women’s Political
Caucus, warned, “We now know the truth about our representatives’ commitment to equality, and those who voted against us will soon learn the
consequences of the gender gap.”288 The New York Times quoted a Democratic aide as saying that “his party’s leaders doubted they would win the
vote . . . but that with the roster of Republican ‘nays,’ Democratic campaign
strategists were ‘licking their chops.’”289 The Times disapproved of this unseemly politicking, opining the next day that the vote against the ERA “had
less to do with the substance of the amendment than with exploiting the
‘gender gap’ and targeting E.R.A. opponents for defeat in next year’s elections.”290 This “cynical gambit,” the editorial writers wagered, “may have
done the E.R.A. . . . more harm than good.”291 ERA champion Representative Patricia Schroeder defended proponents’ decision in a Wall Street
Journal op-ed a few weeks later, noting that suspending normal rules of debate had been integral to the passage of other bills, including important civil
rights legislation.292
Whatever the merits of this last-ditch parliamentary maneuver, it highlighted the role that constitutional amendment advocacy now played for the
women’s movement and for partisan politics. Fighting for the ERA had become a potent political weapon in an increasingly polarized and partisan
atmosphere. Many of the ERA’s congressional allies apparently saw the
amendment primarily in those terms: Senator Tsongas’s avoidance of specifics in the first hearing on ERA II was less a reflection of his lack of preparation and more of a desire to view the amendment in symbolic, political
terms. For lawmakers like Tsongas, the ERA was less a bundle of intricate
284
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legal doctrines than a referendum on conservative legal and political positions on civil rights. The early House hearings in particular were replete
with references by pro-ERA witnesses to the failures of the Reagan Administration to vigorously enforce civil rights laws, with an emphasis on the
weakness of the Executive Branch’s commitment to women’s rights. The
Administration’s deficiencies in this regard demonstrated the need for a
constitutional amendment, proponents argued, because the important business of equality clearly could not be left to the vagaries of bureaucratic
whim. When the Administration protested that it truly was committed to
women’s rights, just not to a constitutional amendment, feminists dismissed
its desultory proposals as “band-aid” solutions to a gaping constitutional
wound. The President and his allies would pay for their opposition to the
ERA, proponents warned again and again.293
Facing growing criticism from within the Administration as well as
without, the White House proposed eliminating sex-biased language from a
number of federal laws. But even the head of the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division admitted that the changes were mostly “cosmetic.”294 ERA supporters
seized on Justice Department attorney Barbara Honegger’s high-profile resignation to highlight stark assessments of the Reagan Administration’s
women’s rights record. Honegger professed to have had faith in Reagan’s
commitment to eradicate sex discriminatory laws as a substitute for supporting the ERA, but, she reported, “not a single law has been changed.”295
Of Reagan, Honegger told the Washington Post, “He doesn’t deserve loyalty because he has betrayed us.”296 Editorialists used Honegger’s resignation to renew their call for “ERA II.”297 Meanwhile, Democratic
presidential candidates tripped over each other in their eagerness to claim
their reverence for the amendment and their commitment to its passage. To
the chagrin of many moderate ERA proponents, several went so far as to
threaten to withhold money for federal programs and projects from states
whose legislatures would not ratify.298
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For feminists, scoring political points was clearly a second-best outcome, and the opportunity proved short-lived and ultimately futile. For a
time, prospects for a women’s renaissance looked somewhat promising.
The Los Angeles Times heralded NOW’s emergence as a “mainstream
force,” noting that the organization’s annual convention had become an obligatory stop for serious Democratic presidential hopefuls.299 Feminists rallied around the first female vice-presidential nominee, Geraldine Ferraro,300
and hoped to abort the Reagan Revolution with a 1984 election victory.301
Of course, it was not to be, and the Reagan landslide was accompanied by a
gain for the President’s party of sixteen seats in the House and only minor
losses in the Senate. The much-touted gender gap had done feminists little
electoral good.302 Many pundits and politicians were beginning to conclude
that the gender gap was less about women’s chagrin over the Reagan Administration’s failure to support the ERA and abortion rights, and more
about women’s concern about the ballooning defense budget and draconian
spending cuts on social and economic programs.303 Moderates lamented the
conservative takeover of the GOP, epitomized by, among other things, the
rejection of a proposal to include support for the ERA in the 1984 Republican platform.304 Pro-ERA members of Reagan’s cabinet, like Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole, suspended their ERA advocacy in deference
to the President’s position.305 The heady excitement generated by Geraldine
299
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Ferraro’s vice-presidential candidacy was short-lived.306 The brief career of
the ERA as political weapon seemed over for good.
However, ERA II arguably epitomized and reinforced a trend toward
the introduction and promotion of constitutional amendments primarily for
symbolic political purposes, with little or no expectation of ultimate passage
and ratification. After the ERA’s defeat, conventional wisdom held that Article V’s prescribed process was no longer a viable path to constitutional
change, except perhaps for very specific, technical alterations.307 But bids
to amend the Constitution hardly ceased; rather, they continued to provide
opportunities to make a dramatic statement of dissatisfaction with existing
constitutional provisions or their interpretation by courts, to force others to
take uncomfortable political stances, and to provide a forum for debating issues of principle without committing to any concrete changes in the law.308
Though the ERA’s career seemed over for the time being, the concept of
proposed constitutional amendment as political weapon emerged very much
alive.
B. ERA II and the Reconstitution of Feminism
By the mid-1980s, most feminists agreed that the ERA’s time had
come and gone. Former NOW ERA activist Mary Jean Collins wrote in
1987 that proposals to reintroduce the amendment “ignore[] the lessons of
the past and [are] the pursuit of predictable failure . . . . Rather than rushing
into a costly and premature effort to change the Constitution, the women’s
movement needs to address the hard task of creating a true consensus for
equality.”309 Catharine MacKinnon’s assessment was much harsher: she
questioned not the wisdom of seeking transformative change or doing so
through a constitutional amendment, but rather whether the ERA as conceived by most of its supporters would have changed much of anything important. In an impassioned 1987 book review, she castigated feminists for
what she characterized as their impoverished conception of sex equality,
306
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nourished by their deliberate underestimation of the inequality and injustice
facing women. She lamented their failure to fight for a meaningful constitutional amendment that would move beyond a focus on sex-based legal
classifications to attack the root causes of male domination.310 “[T]he
ERA’s legal impact,” MacKinnon asserted, “need not have been confined to
being the women’s auxiliary of the equal protection clause.”311 Whether
they believed the quest for ERA I was too ambitious or not ambitious
enough, renewing that quest in earnest was on almost no one’s agenda in
the aftermath of ERA II’s defeat.
Proponents’ failure to effectively use the ERA for electoral gain and
feminists’ despair of the prospects for reintroduction should not obscure the
legacies of ERA II as an important turning point in feminist legal history.
First, the debates over ERA II provided a forum for feminists to consider
what kind of legal and constitutional change they wanted to achieve and
pushed them to translate an abstract equality principle into specific doctrine.
Second, the ERA II struggle drove home for feminists the limitations of
constitutional amendment as a vehicle for achieving their aspirations. Finally, the ERA II episode marked a crucial transition point in feminists’ definition of legal equality. 1983 was hardly the first time that feminists had
struggled with the tension between seeking formal equality of treatment and
a more substantive version of equal rights under law, but ERA I’s demise
provided an opportunity to acknowledge publicly the shortcomings of a focus on the eradication of sex-based legal classifications and to develop a
more expansive vision of equality. As such, ERA II was not merely a reiteration of ERA I, not simply a postscript to a failed ratification campaign,
but a revealing moment in the evolution of legal feminist thought and strategy.
Of course, feminists had grappled with doctrinal questions concerning
the proper constitutional standard of review for laws exerting a disproportionately negative impact on women before 1983. They had faced the question head-on as they challenged veterans’ preference laws, culminating in
the unfavorable 1979 Supreme Court decision in Personnel Administrator
v. Feeney. As we have seen, though, several factors limited their ability fully to theorize constitutional disparate impact in the context of the Feeney
case. First and foremost, in Feeney, feminists were operating within the
confines of an equal protection jurisprudence that had enshrined discriminatory intent as the sine qua non for determining when a facially neutral law
violated equal protection. Accordingly, the appellee in Feeney closely ad310
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hered to the intent requirement, arguing that all circumstantial evidence
pointed to a legislative intent to discriminate against women. Feminist organizations took the argument a step further, advocating for what was, in
practice, a substantial relaxation of the intent requirement, but they did so in
large part on the ground that the veterans’ preference’s disproportionate effect on women was due almost entirely to longstanding de jure discrimination against women by the government—restrictions on women’s
participation in the military. Women’s groups argued that a stringent intent
requirement made little sense in the context of sex discrimination, where
“benign” assumptions about women’s “place” in society, rather than overt
hostility, often animated laws with a negative impact on women’s opportunities. But they worked within the Washington v. Davis framework and
within the parameters set out by the district court opinion striking down the
Massachusetts statute, which, like most cases, did not invite imaginative,
expansive theories about constitutional doctrine.
After the Feeney decision dashed feminists’ hopes for a more expansive reading of the Equal Protection Clause, they increasingly turned to the
ERA as a repository for their hope that the Constitution would vanquish
laws exerting a disparate impact on women. As such, feminists projected
that the ERA would, if ratified, attack facially neutral as well as explicitly
discriminatory laws. But, as discussed earlier, neither the climate of the ratification battle nor the political costs of specificity invited careful consideration of particular doctrinal ramifications. It was easy for feminists to say
they wanted something better than Feeney, but it was more difficult and
strategically risky to articulate exactly what. Leftover strategic reluctance
persisted in the early ERA II hearings, especially given opponents’ tendency to depict disparate impact analysis as a euphemism for “quotas.” But
when opponents probed beneath the surface, proponents were compelled to
provide a much more specific account of ERA disparate impact doctrine, as
we saw in Part II.
The products of these deliberations had a life beyond the ERA II hearings and embodied the shifting orientation of post-ERA feminist jurisprudence. Phyllis Segal, whose memos had informed congressional testimony
about the details of disparate impact doctrine under ERA II, published a
more detailed version of her theory in the Buffalo Law Review in 1984.312
Citing Ann Freedman’s ERA II testimony before Congress, Segal considered and rejected proposals to enact a less stringent intent test and instead
endorsed the “limiting principle[s]” developed during the hearings.313 Relying on these limiting principles, she situated feminists’ new disparate impact analysis in the context of previous attempts to improve on the
Davis/Feeney framework. The renaissance of disparate impact analysis was
312
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not confined to participants in the ERA II campaign. Then-law student Reva Siegel published a note in the Yale Law Journal advocating a disparate
impact reading of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in March 1985.314
Without such an analysis, she argued, the PDA would be a weak weapon
against sex inequality in the workplace.
The renewed enthusiasm for disparate impact analysis was also evident
in an influential article authored by Wendy Williams and Nadine Taub in
the same year.315 In a widely cited 1982 article, Williams had grappled with
the question of how to reconcile sex differences with the equal treatment
model of sex equality analysis that dominated 1970s feminist litigation.316
The “crisis” she described stemmed from an intense and sometimes bitter
dispute among feminists over whether to support legislation that gave pregnant women special benefits not available to other persons temporarily unable to work. In that piece, Williams framed what is often called the “equal
treatment versus special treatment” debate in rather stark terms, arguing that
“[i]f we can’t have it both ways, we need to think carefully about which
way we want to have it.”317 In her view, “for all of its problems, the equality approach is the better one.”318
But two years later, Williams and Taub suggested that perhaps feminists need not choose between the Scylla of assimilation/formal equality/individual treatment and the Charybdis of accommodation/real equality/
group treatment after all.319 Instead, like Segal and Siegel, they suggested
revitalizing disparate impact analysis: “In short, our hope is that by stressing the common origin of facial discrimination and neutral rules with disparate impact we can revive a commitment to eliminating real barriers to
women’s full societal participation.”320 They also hoped to transcend the
conflict between “equal treatment” and “special treatment” feminists by
framing the question in terms of effects: employers would be forbidden to
create a special category for pregnancy, but any employment policy would
be suspect if it had a disparate impact on women. Thus, if a neutral disability benefits policy protected women to a lesser degree than men by, for example, providing disability leave for all employees insufficient to
accommodate pregnancy, it would be susceptible to challenge.
314
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Williams and Taub recognized the formidable “practical and political”
obstacles in the way of a full-blown assault on laws and policies with a disparate effect on women. This “resistance,” they believed, derived from
“three related concerns: the absence of a requirement that ‘intent’ be proved
as an element of discrimination, the costs that may result, and the lack of
immediately apparent limits on the doctrine’s sweep.”321 Thus, though they
wished to preserve the Griggs concept “intact . . . as a secondary approach,”
they “would seek to overcome this concern by identifying acceptable limits.”322 The limits they identified were virtually the same limits developed
in the course of the ERA II hearings: “At a minimum . . . those neutral rules
which are traceable to, build on, reproduce or perpetuate the old notions and
hierarchies must be justified by a business necessity.”323 Indeed, Williams
and Taub cited the testimony of Segal and Freedman from the 1983 hearings to support their analysis.
Two years later, Ann Freedman and Sylvia Law challenged the argument advanced by political scientist Jane Mansbridge that the ERA, by the
time of its demise, would have had little practical effect on the law. On the
contrary, they asserted, “The ERA would have had a profoundly important
impact on laws and policies that discriminate in fact, but not in words.”324
Whether ERA I would have had such an effect is unknowable, but feminists
had certainly done all they could to ensure such a meaning for ERA II. Although they had frequently relied on the Equal Protection Clause for limiting principles in the ERA II hearings, disparate impact analysis was a
crucial area in which proponents made clear how the amendment would depart, rather dramatically, from existing equal protection jurisprudence.
If the life of disparate impact analysis illustrates how the ERA II debates helped to redefine the meaning of “equality of rights under the law,”
the compromises proponents made during the hearings highlight the limitations of the ERA as a means for accomplishing the ends feminists sought.
The paradox of the legal feminist position after the demise of ERA I is
striking. For the first time in over a decade, feminists were in a position to
shed the constraints of the ratification process and reconsider the scope of
their aspirations for legal and constitutional change. On the other hand, the
defeat of ERA I reflected the increasingly conservative political climate in
which feminists operated. The reintroduction of ERA II meant that feminists had the opportunity to create a new legislative history for the amendment, one that reflected their current aspirations. But attempting to achieve
these changes through the same constitutional amendment that had proven
so controversial even before conservative domination of the Executive
321
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Branch and the Senate placed severe political constraints on feminists’ attempts to reconfigure and expand the ERA’s meaning. After the disappointments of ERA I and II, feminists could understandably conclude that,
as Mary Jean Collins put it in 1987, “constitutional amendments serve to ratify the present rather than paving the way for the future.”325
The ERA II experience highlighted the Catch-22 in which feminists
found themselves: every victory they won in incorporating their more expansive visions of equality into the amendment’s legislative history would
cost them votes, if not in Congress, then in the state legislatures. Feminists
were already cognizant that constitutional amendment might not be the best
vehicle through which to achieve their goals—hence their ambivalence
about the ERA’s reintroduction in the first place. The ERA II experience
could only have reinforced those doubts.
Indeed, doubts about the wisdom of seeking change through constitutional amendment went beyond the practical political difficulties of ratification in the absence of consensus; it also entailed significant strategic
drawbacks. Keeping the federal ERA in play constrained the arguments
feminists felt they could make in litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment and under state ERAs. Whereas the ERA campaign, at its height, had
arguably strengthened feminists’ case for constitutional change through judicial reinterpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, continuing to press
for the amendment in the face of determined and successful opposition
tended to highlight the distance between feminists’ aspirations and the extent of popular agreement. Further, proponents would always be subject to
accusations of duplicity so long as they claimed that a clear legislative history would constrain the ERA’s future application when they not-sosecretly hoped that future electoral victories would produce more sympathetic judges who would interpret the ERA’s abstract wording more expansively.
Though it would be easy to overlook them given the more prominent
political constraints on the ERA’s meaning, the ERA II debates also revealed certain stubborn substantive limitations that proved less than amenable to reinvention. It was particularly difficult for proponents to dispel the
notion, which the amendment’s original legislative history had itself promoted, that the ERA embodied essentially a singular principle of absolute
equal treatment. That notion, useful in the early debates over ERA I because of proponents’ desire to rid the law books of explicit sex-based classifications, bred confusion about the impact of the ERA on affirmative action
and other policies that did not fall into this category. By the time of ERA
II, feminists hoped the amendment would promulgate an antihierarchy principle of sorts in the form of disparate impact analysis. But as the debates
over ERA II and the subsequent controversy over pregnancy benefits revealed, feminists struggled to agree on what such an antihierarchy principle
325
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would look like in practice. Seeking change through a constitutional
amendment begged not only for internal consensus on what means were
best suited to the ends of antisubordination, but also a singular principle that
would be applicable across various circumstances and areas of the law.
Indeed, in this respect, feminists had come full circle. Whereas feminist ERA skeptics of the pre-1970s era had bemoaned the ERA’s “rigidity”
and lack of “flexibility” because it might endanger protective labor legislation, proponents of ERA I steadfastly insisted on an equality principle of
virtually universal applicability. Along these lines, the authors of the 1971
Yale ERA Article wrote, “the interrelated character of a system of legal
equality for the sexes makes a rule of universal application imperative. No
one exception, resulting in unequal treatment for women, can be confined in
its impact to one area alone. Equal rights for women, as for races, is a unity.”326 Now some feminists again began to question the feasibility of applying a universal principle to a complicated and diverse array of problems.
Some younger feminist scholars, examining the ERA ratification battle
from an academic perspective, wondered whether continuing a polarizing
struggle was the best way to unite women whose interests were far more
harmonious than the rancor of ERA rhetoric would suggest. Deborah
Rhode, a young Stanford Law School professor, suggested that the women
to whom Schlafly’s movement had appealed were reachable, but that “feminists might do well to pause in the pursuit of an increasingly divisive
constitutional symbol and focus on more concrete responses to structural
inequities.”327
Feminists had also become more cognizant of the limitations of a constitutional amendment that did not reach private action. Even proponents’
wildest imaginations could not transform the ERA into an affirmative duty
on the part of the government to take active steps to remedy inequality in
the absence of a proven constitutional violation. As proponents acknowledged—and emphasized to skeptics—the ERA was a limitation on state action and a license to legislate, but not an unavoidable imperative to remedy
inequality.
More generally, proponents recognized, constitutional adjudication had
its limits as a tool for pursuing legal change. Williams said as much in her
influential critique of 1970s Supreme Court sex equality jurisprudence: “To
say that courts are not and never have been the source of radical social
change is an understatement.”328 Legislation would be the means of achieving feminists’ ultimate goal of redefining the meaning of equality itself.
“[T]o the extent that the law of the public world must be reconstructed to
reflect the needs and values of both sexes, change must be sought from leg-
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islatures rather than the courts,” Williams wrote.329 Section 2 of the ERA
provided a basis for such legislation, but as we saw in Part II, ERA proponents had to tread carefully in claiming a role for section 2 beyond that of
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.330 While the Court had decided
many Fourteenth Amendment questions unfavorably during ERA I’s pendency, the expansive reading of Congress’s Section 5 enforcement power
remained largely undisturbed, and feminists certainly did not wish to imply
that a narrower reading was appropriate.
At the same time, the Court’s increasingly conservative race jurisprudence not only made it less advantageous for feminists to analogize the
ERA’s impact to the treatment of race discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, it also threatened—or at least complicated—coalitions between racial justice and feminist organizations. As Freedman and Law
recalled in 1987, “[ERA] proponents had no desire to urge that women were
entitled to a greater measure of constitutional protection than black people.
Rather, most ERA proponents sought common cause between those who
struggled against racism and sexism.”331 ERA supporters hoped and believed that “the ERA’s stronger protection against laws that were sexist in
impact would have a spillover effect extending stronger protection to blacks
injured by laws that were racist in impact. But it was difficult to use the actual words of the ERA to support this pragmatic belief.”332 No doubt it was
also politically inexpedient to highlight this “spillover effect,” because it
played into the hands of opponents who forecasted dire consequences for
the ERA beyond the realm of sex equality.
Significantly, the internal debates among feminists over ERA II’s relationship to abortion and reproductive rights, and the uneasy compromise
presented in the hearings, drove home many feminists’ increasing unwillingness to divorce constitutional sex equality from reproductive freedom.
Advocates like Rhonda Copelon called explicitly for a reunification of sex
equality and abortion rights in 1983. Other prominent feminist lawyers
soon followed suit. Sylvia Law’s Rethinking Sex and the Constitution and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade were two of the more prominent published expressions
of this view. Ginsburg, by then a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit, acknowledged “the view that for political reasons the reproductive autonomy controversy should be isolated from the general de-
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bate on equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for women and
men,” but ultimately rejected that view.333 Law similarly acknowledged that
[t]o assert that the fourteenth amendment or a state ERA mandates a concept
of sex equality that encompasses a woman’s interest in controlling reproductive capacity would inescapably affect the effort to enact a federal ERA. Nevertheless, it is important to explore the political and legal separation of sex
equality and reproductive freedom and to evaluate the value of a more integrated approach.334

Others were less circumspect about suggesting a change of course. In
a brief but influential essay written in 1983, MacKinnon offered a searing
critique of feminists’ earlier decision to rest the campaign for abortion
rights on privacy grounds, rather than on a rationale based in equality or
freedom.335 By 1991, NOW activist Twiss Butler joined MacKinnon in excoriating the ERA campaign for asking too little of constitutional equality,
especially in the context of abortion and pregnancy, and cited the 1983
ERA II hearings as her primary example.336 In her own retrospective questioning of feminist strategy, MacKinnon suggested that she had held her
tongue while the ERA was still in play, but once the amendment appeared
dead once and for all, “[t]here seemed little to lose, even from the truth.”337
Whether one was sympathetic or impatient with feminists’ concessions
to the political exigencies of the ERA debates, it was clear that feminists
would fight the battles of the 1980s and 1990s on new terrain. Without a
constitutional amendment hanging in the balance, feminists were free to
draw connections between areas of law formerly considered taboo. Unconstrained by what they now perceived as the strictures of “formal equality,”
they explored new frontiers of legal intervention like disparate impact analysis and comparable worth, legislation to enact economic rights for women,
and an embrace of reproductive rights and eventually sexual freedom as essential components of sex equality. From the debates over ERA II, femi-
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nists emerged intent on pursuing not merely “equality in theory,” but
“equality in fact.”
CONCLUSION
The story of ERA II sheds light on themes important both to historians
and to scholars of social movements and constitutional change. The ERA II
campaign confirms the imperative to look beyond courts and litigation as
sites of constitutional conflict. The process whereby proponents of constitutional change attempted to create new legislative history for an already
controversial and much-debated amendment provides an intriguing example
of the extrajuridical creation of constitutional meaning. It proved to be one
in which dialogue with opponents was virtually unavoidable. This dialogic
process included not only feminist and antifeminist movement activists, but
also congressional combatants—lawmakers with various stakes in the debate over ERA II. In part because the debate took place in the context of
congressional consideration of the amendment—rather than, say, in the
course of litigation or of a ratification campaign directed at state legislatures—ERA II’s trajectory highlighted the potential of proposed amendments to serve as partisan political battering rams.
The debate over ERA II also proved a formative one for the social
movement that somewhat reluctantly sponsored its reintroduction, yielding
substantive and strategic reassessments on the part of advocates at a transitional moment in the history of legal feminism. Thus the story of ERA II
highlights the significance of even failed attempts to amend the Constitution, not only to the extent that they influence judicial reinterpretation of existing constitutional provisions—as the ERA I campaign arguably did—but
also in their role as a vehicle for social movement agenda-setting.
From an historical standpoint, the ERA II debates underscore the scope
and limitations of the legal and political changes feminists and their opponents achieved between the introduction and passage of ERA I in the early
1970s, and ERA II’s ultimate defeat in Congress in 1983 and 1984. An
amendment with broad-based bipartisan support had become a partisan
weapon deployed by politicians and advocates across the political spectrum.
Moreover, because feminists had achieved much of the agenda set out in the
original ERA I hearings but still faced a determined and well-organized opposition to their residual goals, by the early 1980s the amendment had acquired new legal meanings. A decade of political struggle over the ERA,
reproductive freedom, and civil rights more generally made a new set of issues salient: facially neutral laws exerting a disproportionate impact on
women replaced overt sex-classifications as the primary target of feminist
legal strategy, while resurgent conservatism placed battles over abortion,
state action, homosexuality, and the military at the center of the struggle.
But the ratification debates had proven more conducive to histrionics,
innuendo, and outrage than to sustained doctrinal parsing. Feminists were
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understandably ambivalent about defending ERA II so soon after ERA I’s
demise, but recognized that for better or worse, they had to decide exactly
what they could ask of the amendment, legally and politically. Opponents
asked difficult and probing questions about the amendment’s specific legal
ramifications, compelling a response from supporters. Proponents’ internal
debates and the public testimony they produced revealed both creative
thinking about doctrinal possibilities and a sense of painfully acquired realpolitik. Some of the positions feminists took in the ERA II hearings, such
as the development of a more sophisticated disparate impact analysis, laid a
promising foundation for future advocacy; others, such as the pained machinations surrounding the relationship between the ERA and reproductive
rights, revealed the limitations of amendment advocacy as a means to the
ends feminists sought.
The introduction, consideration, and defeat of ERA II marked a pivotal
moment in the history of legal feminism. Far more than a mere postscript
to the battle over ERA I, the debate over ERA II helped to redefine both the
strategy and the substance of the feminist legal agenda. Substantively, the
ERA II debate solidified an emerging shift from formal equality to a concern with disparate impact and combating hierarchy. Moreover, the debate
forced feminists to grapple with the specific doctrinal dilemmas entailed by
this shift. Strategically, ERA II enabled feminists to explore the possibilities of using a proposed constitutional amendment as a partisan political
weapon and embodied a new electoral turn in movement politics. Ultimately, ERA II drove home the limitations of constitutional amendment as
the means to feminist ends, but the process of constructing a new meaning
for the amendment had important and lasting effects on the legal feminism
that emerged, reconstituted, from the ashes of defeat.
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